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USING PROFITS TO COMPENSATE A SERVICE
PROVIDER-POTENTIAL PARTNERSHIP
CHARACTERIZATION
CAROLYN S. NACHMIAS*
Whoever starts out toward the unknown must consent to venture
alone.
Andre Gide, Journals (1927) (Justin O'Brien) (trans.)
P ROBLEMS of partnership characterization are never simple to re-
solve, particularly when the parties to the transaction under scru-
tiny do not desire the tax consequences of a partnership relationship
but aggressively seek its economic advantages. Moreover, unraveling
the effects of recharacterization is especially difficult when the form
of the transaction is a service contract. Service contracts that run the
risk of partnership characterization are those that include a provision
for contingent compensation to the service provider. The risk of re-
characterization is insubstantial where the compensation is measured
as a percentage of gross receipts or of gross income. However, where
the compensation is measured as a percentage of net profits, there is a
very real risk of recharacterization.
The problems associated with recharacterization of these service
contracts are difficult because, if the relationship is deemed to be a
partnership, the service provider at the outset has received a partner-
ship profits interest in exchange for future services. The tax conse-
quences of such an event are largely uncertain, but may be very
substantial. The tax advisor trying to weigh tax concerns against a
client's business desires may feel very much alone in determining just
how much weight should be accorded the tax concerns.
Service contracts in which a constructive partnership is deemed to
arise compound all the problems associated with constructive equity
interests generally together with those associated with the receipt of a
profits interest for services specifically. Because constructive interests
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by their nature are unanticipated, the opportunities to take protective
measures to mitigate the tax impact of the receipt of a profits interest
for services are largely unavailable. Thus, the need to avoid over-
reaching and ultimate recharacterization at the outset is critical.
The following discussion will, therefore, begin by considering the
existing case law and administrative pronouncements reviewing the
characterization of various service contract relationships. Planning
strategies to avoid partnership treatment are readily apparent from
these decisions and pronouncements. However, inevitably some trans-
actions will occur in which steps were not taken to avoid recharacteri-
zation, either because appropriate counsel was not sought, or because
business concerns overrode legal ones. The following discussion will
conclude by considering current schools of thought on the conse-
quences of receipt of a profits interest for services. With the recent
decisions of the United States Tax Court and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Campbell v. Commissioner,( the
law in this area is in a state of flux.
I. CHARACTERIZATION OF A SERVICE CONTRACT As A PARTNERSHIP
FOR TAX PURPOSES
For two reasons, the issue of constructive partnership arises most
frequently in the area of service contracts. 2 First, the service provi-
der's performance of services can be readily characterized either as
services performed for compensation or as services contributed to a
partnership in exchange for a partnership interest. Second, the tax
consequences of a constructive partnership in the context of service
contracts can be particularly significant. The characterization issue
may arise in several situations. For example, a cash basis service pro-
vider may enter into a service contract with a proprietor for a one-
time performance of services; in exchange, the service provider will
reccive a percentage of the enterprise's profits to be paid over a period
of several years. If the form of the service contract is respected, the
service provider can spread its income from the enterprise over an ex-
tended period. However, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may ar-
gue that the service provider and proprietor are actually partners, and
therefore the service provider should report its total distributive share
1. 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991), rev'g 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236 (1990).
2. Constructive partnership issues also arise in connection with loans, see, e.g., Arthur
Venneri Co. v. United States, 340 F.2d 337 (Ct. C1. 1965); Hartman v. Commissioner, 17
T.C.M. (CCH) 1020 (1958), and leases, see, e.g., Haley v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 815 (5th Cir.
1953); Place v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 199 (1951).
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of partnership income for the taxable year of the constructive partner-
ship in which the services were performed.' Alternatively, in the same
situation, the service provider may observe that the enterprise is gener-
ating significant long-term capital gain and find it advantageous to
argue for the existence of a constructive partnership in order to have
its compensation classified, at least in part, as a distributive share of
partnership capital gain. However, such a position is very difficult to
sustain, since a taxpayer is generally bound by the transaction form he
or she selected. 4
A. Tax Definition of Partnership
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) defines "partnership" as a
"syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated or-
ganization, through or by means of which any business, financial op-
eration, or venture is carried on, and which is not . . . a trust or estate
or a corporation." ' The two most important decisions dealing with
the tax definition of a partnership are the United States Supreme
Court decisions in Tower v. Commissioners and Commissioner v. Cul-
bertson.7 In Tower, the Court held that a partnership is created
"when persons join together their money, goods, labor, or skill for
the purpose of carrying on a trade, profession, or business and when
there is a community of interest in the profits and losses."' The Cul-
bertson Court provided further elaboration of the partnership defini-
3. Partners must report their distributive share of partnership income for a taxabl! year
whether or not it is actually distributed, Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a) (as amended in 1989); cash
basis service providers only report income as it is actually or constructively received by them, id.
§ 1.446-1(c)(I)(i) (as amended in 1992). In a case similar to the situation discussed, in which the
service provider's compensation was measured as a percentage of gross receipts, the Tax Court
found that a constructive partnership did not exist. Robinson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 20, 35
(1965). The IRS has indicated, however, that an arrangement in which the service provider's
compensation is measured by a percentage of net profits will be vulnerable to recharacterization.
Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100.
4. See, e.g., Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067 (1964).
5. I.R.C. §§ 761(a), 7701(a)(2) (1992). The regulations go on to state that the tax definition
of partnership is "broader in scope than the common law meaning of partnership," and that the
term "may include groups not commonly called partnerships." Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (as
amended in 1972).
6. 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
7. 337 U.S. 733 (1949). Both of these Supreme Court decisions dealing with the tax defini-
tion of partnership involved family partnerships. In a family partnership, the owner of a success-
ful enterprise transfers the enterprise to a partnership consisting of several family members,
Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 736-37; Tower, 327 U.S. at 285-86. This spreads the income from the
enterprise among several taxpayers and thereby reduces the overall tax burden on the enterprise
income. Though such situations are subjected to heightened scrutiny because of the absence of
an arm's length transaction, the analysis in the two cases has molded all subsequent decisions on
the issue of constructive partnership.
8. Tower, 327 U.S. at 286 (citations omitted).
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tion, stating that the issue to be resolved is whether, considering all of
the facts-the agreement, the conduct of the parties in the execution
of its provisions, their statements, the testimony of disinterested per-
sons, the relationship of the parties, their respective abilities and capi-
tal contributions, the actual control of the income and the purposes
for which it is used, and any other facts throwing light on their true
intent-the parties in good faith, and acting with a business purpose,
intended to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise.9
While the Court stressed that all facts should be considered and that
the absence of any one should not be conclusive,' 0 the cases suggest
that four basic elements are indicative of partnership intent: an agree-
ment, a community of interest in profits and losses, a joint contribu-
tion of capital or services, and a joint participation in management
and control." Thus, on the basis of the federal tax definition of part-
nership articulated by the Supreme Court in Tower and Culbertson,
the courts have developed the four-part test for determining partner-
ship intent. It is this test that has been applied when considering the
tax character of service contracts.' 2
B. Application of Partnership Definition to Service Contracts
1. Beck Chemical Equipment Corp. v. Commissioner
In Beck Chemical Equipment Corp. v. Commissioner, " the tax-
payer entered into an oral agreement with a manufacturing company
to supply the company's pending patents and services for a flame-
thrower invented by its principal shareholder. 4 In exchange, the tax-
payer was to receive half of the total net profits from the manufacture
and sale of the device when the enterprise terminated at the end of
9. Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 742.
10. Id. at 742, 744-45. The Court stressed that all the facts must be considered to determine
whether the parties "joined together in good faith to conduct a business, having agreed that the
services or capital to be contributed presently by each is of such value to the partnership that the
contributor should participate in the distribution of profits .... " Id. at 744-45. On remand, the
Tax Court found that there was no partnership for the tax years in question. 9 T.C.M. (CCH)
647, 659 (1950).
I1. See, e.g., Arthur Venneri Co. v. United States, 340 F.2d 337, 342-43 (Ct. CI. 1965);
Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077-78 (1964); Beck Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 27 T.C. 840, 849 (1957); Place v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 199, 206 (1951); Hartman v.
Commissioner, 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 1020, 1023-24 (1958).
12. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 13-48.
13. 27 T.C. 840 (1957).
14. Id. at 843.
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World War II.11 An operating loss in a particular year would offset
the ultimate amount of net profits to be divided.' 6 The manufacturing
company was to be solely responsible for the management and control
of the enterprise,' and it held itself out to the general public and to
the government as the owner of the enterprise, never filing a partner-
ship tax return. 8
As a result of several disputes with the manufacturing company, in
part because of the company's failure to distribute profits at the ap-
propriate time, the taxpayer commenced litigation which ultimately
established, over the manufacturing company's vehement objection,
the existence of a joint venture partnership for state law purposes.1 9
Eventually, the taxpayer received its share of the net profits. 0 The
IRS contended that a partnership had existed for tax purposes be-
tween the taxpayer and the manufacturing company from the incep-
tion of their agreement, and that the taxpayer should have reported its
distributive share of partnership income in the taxable years in which
such income was earned, not in the taxable years when the income was
actually distributed.2
The Tax Court reviewed the Culbertson22 decision and stated that
the Culbertson principles were equally applicable to all situations in
which a partnership allegedly existed for tax purposes, even though
circumstances might indicate otherwise.2 3 In deciding that the facts
suggested that the taxlpayer and the manufacturing company had a
"mutual proprietary interest in the venture's profits," the court relied
on the following factors: the taxpayer had the burden of proving the
nonexistence of a partnership, there was no agreement indicating that
a master-servant relationship existed between the parties, the taxpayer
had succeeded in establishing the existence of a partnership for state
law purposes, the taxpayer had indicated it was a joint venturer with
the manufacturer on its own tax returns for the years in question, and
the taxpayer's participation in net profits suggested a proprietary in-
terest in profits .24 The court observed that the absence of joint partici-
pation in management and control was not dispositive, but was only
15. Id. at 843. The agreement was entered into in 1942. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Beck Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 840, 845 (1957).
19. Id. at 845-46.
20. Id. at 846.
21. Id. at 848.
22. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 327 U.S. 733 (1949).
23. Beck Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 840, 849 (1957).
24. Id. at 850-51, 853.
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one of the factors to be considered in the overall determination."5 Sim-
ilarly, the court admitted that the method of loss sharing, through
adjustment of the net profits, could be compatible with either a com-
pensation or partnership arrangement, but that this factor, too, was
only one of many to be considered3 6
The court noted that both parties had contributed elements neces-
sary to the enterprise and concluded that a partnership existed for the
taxable years in question. 2" Therefore, the court decided, the taxpayer
should report the income in the year it was earned, rather than in the
year in which it was distributed.28
Absent the taxpayer's own efforts to establish the existence of a
partnership, the facts of Beck Chemical seem to suggest the existence
of an employer-employee relationship. The manufacturing company
clearly intended an employment arrangement, and in no way indicated
that it and the taxpayer were coproprietors of the enterprise or part-
ners for tax purposes. The circumstances of the arrangement were not
essentially different from other service contracts that have been held
not to be partnerships for tax purposes.2 9 The outstanding factor in
Beck Chemical is the taxpayer's own initial position that a partnership
existed for state law purposes, which it apparently assumed for the
purposes of enhancing its litigation position concerning a separate,
non-tax issue. Once the taxpayer adopted this position, it thereafter
indicated on its federal tax returns that it was a partner of the manu-
facturing company, but did not report any profits from the partner-
ship because of the manufacturing company's refusal to divulge the
information needed for such reporting.30 These factors seem to have
substantially influenced the court's decision that a constructive part-
nership existed for tax purposes. The court was unwilling to allow the
taxpayer to argue against the existence of a constructive partnership in
order to achieve a tax advantage" after it had already argued for the
25. Id. at 852.
26. Id. at 851.
27. Id. at 852-53.
28. Beck Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 840, 856 (1957). Before deciding
this, the court resolved another issue. The taxpayer argued that his dispute with his partner
prevented the income of the partnership from being includable in income until the dispute was
resolved and the amounts were actually received. This claim was essentially a claim of right
doctrine argument: the taxpayer was asserting that he had "no established or uncontroverted
right to the funds." Id. at 855. The court rejected this argument as inapplicable to prevent a
partner's distributive share of partnership income from being taxable. Id. at 856.
29. See Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067 (1964).
30. 27 T.C. at 845.
31. As a consequence of the decision that the taxpayer should have reported the income in
the years it was earned, as a distributive share of partnership income, the taxpayer was liable for
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existence of a constructive partnership in order to resolve a state court
issue in its favor. Though the requirements for a constructive partner-
ship for state law purposes and for federal tax purposes are not neces-
sarily the same,32 the intent of the alleged partner for federal tax
purposes is determined by all the facts and circumstances, including
the intent demonstrated in a previous legal proceeding. Thus, though
the facts might not otherwise have supported the existence of a con-
structive partnership for tax purposes, the taxpayer's own actions
demonstrating an intent to join together in the present conduct of an
enterprise, when considered with other relevant facts, were sufficient
to create one.
Beck Chemical also demonstrates that the absence of participation
in control and management will not prevent a court from finding a
constructive partnership if other factors indicate that one exists.
Moreover, Beck Chemical emphasizes the significance of participation
in net profits as resembling a proprietary interest in profits, particu-
larly when those profits are to be offset by losses generated in years in
which there were no net profits. 3
2. Luna v.Commissioner
As Luna v. Commissioner3 4 demonstrates, it is generally very diffi-
cult for a service provider to argue for the recharacterization of a
service contract as a partnership for tax purposes unless it is able to
produce concrete evidence indicating that this was the venturers' in-
tent. In Luna, the taxpayer entered into an agreement with an insur-
ance company whereby, in exchange for his management services, he
was to receive a percentage of the renewal commissions from an insur-
ance policy he had designed." Several years later, the parties decided
to end the arrangement, and the insurance company paid the taxpayer
a fixed sum to discharge the insurance company's obligation to pay
penalties for failure to file excess profits tax returns for those years. These penalties would not
have been incurred had the taxpayer failed to report the amount as compensation income in the
year it was distributed. Id. at 857-60.
32. Generally, the state law requirements for a constructive partnership are more difficult
to satisfy than the federal tax law requirements. See UNrm. PARTNER HiP ACT § 6(l), 6 U.L.A. 22
(1969).
33. Normally, equity participation arrangements provide for at least yearly determinations
of contingent compensation, rent, or interest (in the case of participating loan joint ventures).
While losses may reduce the contingent income to zero in an unsuccessful year, the existence of
an operational loss in one year usually will not reduce the subsequent year's net profits for this
purpose.
34. 42 T.C. 1067 (1964).
35. Id. at 1069-71.
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the taxpayer's renewal commissions.3 6 The taxpayer reported the
amount as capital gain from the sale of a partnership interest; the IRS
contended that the amount should be recognized as compensation in-
come."
The Tax Court first reviewed the Supreme Court's holding in
Culbertson" and determined that the essential question was whether
the parties intended to, and did in fact, join together for the present
conduct of an enterprise. 9 The court countered the taxpayer's argu-
ment that a partnership had been formed for state law purposes
(though it remained unconvinced that the taxpayer was correct in that
respect) by observing that the existence of a partnership for state law
purposes was not determinative of the issue of intent for federal tax
purposes. 4° The court then listed factors it considered significant in
determining the parties' intent.4' The court specifically stated that no
factor alone was conclusive of the issue.12
In deciding that the taxpayer was not a partner of the insurance
company and that the taxpayer's lump sum payment must be reported
as compensation income, the court considered several facts particu-
larly important. First, neither the taxpayer nor the insurance company
in any way indicated, prior to the suit, an intent to join together as
partners. Partnership tax returns were not filed, and neither party
held itself out to others as a joint venturer with the other. 43 Second,
the taxpayer was not authorized to engage in the insurance business
except as an agent selling policies."4 Third, the written contract itself
36. Id. at 1071-74.
37. Id. at 1074.
38. See Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); supra notes 7-10.
39. Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077 (1964). Compare Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-07-013
(Nov. 15, 1989) (relying on Luna, the IRS found organization composed of harbor pilots who
contributed services to the organization while maintaining mutual interest in its net profits to be
a partnership) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-25-092 (Mar. 30, 1989) (where IRS found arrangement
between state municipalities to construct, operate, and maintain system to transport a commod-
ity throughout the buyer-municipality region to be partnership for federal income tax purposes,
based on fact that both parties made contributions to the venture, and parties exercised mutual
control and assumed mutual responsibilities for the venture) with Form Builders v. Commis-
sioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1415, 1417 (1990) (relying upon Luna, the court found no partnership
existed because the parties' arrangement lacked requisite joint profit motive) and Koss v. Com-
missioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 882, 891 (1989) (court found requisite intent to form partnership
lacking), aff'd, 908 F.2d 962 (3d Cir. 1990).
40. 42 T.C. at 1077.
41. Id. at 1077-78. The list basically included all the elements of partnership discussed
above, plus several more objective factors, such as whether the parties filed federal partnership
returns, whether the enterprise was conducted in the joint names of the parties, and whether the
parties represented to others that they were joint venturers. Id.
42. Id. at 1077.
43. Id. at 1078.
44. Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067, 1078 (1964).
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was structured as an employment contract, and agents recruited by the
taxpayer were employees of the insurance company. 45 Fourth, the tax-
payer received a percentage of the commissions on each policy sold,
but did not have an interest in the net profits generated by the sale,
and would not share in any losses resulting from the sale of the pol-
icy. 46
Though the sharing of losses is generally not requisite to a finding
of constructive partnership, the absence of loss sharing places a heav-
ier burden on a service provider trying to prove the existence of a con-
structive partnership. This is particularly true if neither the service
contract nor the conduct of the parties indicates that the parties in-
tended to be partners, and if, as the court believed to be the case in
Luna, the idea of a constructive partnership arose as an after-
thought.47 Similarly, the fact that the service provider participates in
the control and management of the enterprise is not indicative of a
constructive partnership if the facts establish that the intent of the
parties was to establish control and management by the service pro-
vider as an employee-manager, rather than as a coproprietor.
Service providers almost by definition participate in the manage-
ment and control of the proprietor's enterprise. 48 The courts must de-
termine the exact nature of the service provider's role in the
proprietor's enterprise, as evidenced by the venturers' agreement,
their actual conduct, and other objective criteria. Factors other than
control and management thus assume greater importance in establish-
ing the intent of the parties to join together in the present conduct of
an enterprise.
Luna demonstrates the rigorous scrutiny that a service provider will
receive when it argues for the existence of a constructive partnership
in order to improve its tax position. The IRS's approach to recharac-
terization, however, is also result-oriented; it will not litigate such a
case unless recharacterization will generate tax revenue. Such an un-
principled approach does not support the development of a coherent
body of case law. Perhaps the IRS's use of this approach would be
deterred if its recharacterization argument was subject to the same
level of scrutiny as applies to taxpayers.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. In loan and lease transactions involving profit sharing, lender/lessor generally does not
participate in the management and control of the enterprise of the borrower/lessee. Thus, a
lender or lessor possessing significant management and control rights is automatically at risk for
partnership recharacterization. See. e.g., Place v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 199, 206 (1951); Tal-
bot Mills v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 95 (1944), aff'd, 146 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1945), aff'd, 325 U.S.
521 (1946).
$Smpl.
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II. TAx CONSEQUENCES OF A SERVICE PROVIDER'S RECEIPT OF A
PARTNERSHIP PROFITS INTEREST
Under the broad sweep of Code section 61,49 there can be little
doubt that the receipt of a partnership interest in exchange for past,
present, and/or future services provided by a service provider may
give rise to ordinary income. Because the service provider's construc-
tive partnership interest would likely be treated as a profits interest, as
opposed to a capital interest, the amount and timing of the income is
uncertain. This uncertainty in turn affects the amount and timing of
the deduction to which the proprietor is entitled as a result of compen-
sating the service provider with a partnership interest. The following
discussion explores the distinction between profits and capital inter-
ests, the common law and statutory treatment to date of the taxpayer
who receives a profits interest, and the current views regarding the tax
consequences of receipt of a partnership profits interest for services.
Given the recent decisions of the Tax Court and the Eighth Circuit in
Campbell v. Commissioner,50 there is a very real possibility of imme-
diate taxation of the receipt of a profits interest. Even greater caution
is now required than before when structuring a service contract with
profit sharing to avoid partnership characterization. While the IRS's
latest explanation of the tax consequences of receipt of a profits inter-
est gives a great deal of comfort to taxpayers, the scope of Revenue
Procedure 93-27's 51 application is uncertain and probably does not ex-
tend to constructive partnerships. 2
A. What is a Profits Interest7
Neither the Code nor the regulations defines the term "profits inter-
est". 3 One commentator has defined it based on an analysis of Treas-
ury Regulation sections 1.721-1(b)(1) and 1.704-1(e)(1)(v) 54 as "any
49, I.R.C. § 61(1992).
50. 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991), rev'g 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236 (1990).
51. 1993-24 I.R.B. 63.
52. See discussion infra part II.G.
53. ARTHUR B. WILLIS ET AL., PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 6.04 (4th ed. 1989). Note that the
first step in analyzing the tax consequences of a profits interest received in exchange for services
is determining whether a profits interest actually exists. See discussion infra part II.A. Treasury
Regulation § 1.704- l(e)(v) (1994) defines a capital interest as follows:
an interest in the assets of the partnership, which is distributable to the owner of the
capital interest upon his withdrawal from the partnership or upon liquidation of the
partnership. The mere right to participate in the earnings and profits of a partnership
is not a capital interest in the partnership.
54. WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
5.0511], at 5-22 (1977). Authority for McKee's definition is found in Treasury Regulation sec-
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interest which would not entitle the holder to receive assets on an im-
mediate liquidation, but does give the holder the right to share in fu-
ture partnership profits or earnings." 5 The IRS has defined the term
profits interest by what it is not, a capital interest.5 6
The following example illustrates the distinction between a profits
interest and a capital interest:
X and Y form partnership XY. X gets a capital interest. Y gets a
profits interest. X contributes an apartment building with a cost
tions 1.721-1(b)(1) and 1.704-1(e)(l)(v). Treasury Regulation section 1.721-1(b)(l) distinguishes
profits from capital interests by providing, in part: "To the extent that any of the partners gives
up any part of his right to be repaid his contribution (as distinguished from a share in partner-
ship profits) in favor of another partner as compensation for services . . . section 721 does not
apply." Treasury Regulation section 1.704-1(e)(l)(v) provides, in part: "The mere right to par-
ticipate in the earnings and profits of a partnership is not a capital interest in the partnership."
A recent report of the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association recommends that
Treasury Regulation section 1.721-1(b)(1) be amended to provide the following definition of a
partnership capital interest:
To the extent that any person receives an interest in partnership capital as compensa-
tion for services (or in satisfaction of an obligation) section 721 does not apply. A
person will be deemed to have received an interest in partnership capital if such person
has the right (with respect to the partnership interest so received) to share in the pro-
ceeds of a sale of the partnership assets at fair market value followed by a complete
liquidation of the partnership immediately after the receipt of such partnership inter-
est.
American Bar Association Section of Taxation, Report on the Tax Consequences of the Receipt
of a Partnership Profits Interest for Services (Oct. 22, 1992), reprinted in 46 TAx LAW. 453
(1993) [hereinafter ABA Report]. The report goes on to recommend that "a partnership profits
interest be defined as any equity interest in the partnership other than a partnership capital inter-
est." Id. at 236.
55. McKEE ET AL., supra note 54, at 5.05[l]. In contrast to his definition of a profits
interest, McKee defines a capital interest as "any interest which would entitle the holder to re-
ceive a share of partnership assets upon a hypothetical winding up and liquidation of the part-
nership immediately following acquisition of the interest." Id. In Mark IV Pictures, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1171 (1990), aff'd, 969 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1992), the Tax
Court concluded that the taxpayer had received capital interests for services because it had "the
right to receive a specified share of the partnerships' liquidation proceeds (assets)." Id. at 1176.
Whether in fact it actually received anything after outside creditors were repaid and the limited
partners were returned their capital contributions was irrelevant. The mere right to receive a
share of liquidation proceeds determined the character of the interests. Id. While it is difficult to
see why the court bothered to distinguish a capital interest from a profits interest in this context
after its decision in Campbell, see infra notes 241-92, it is nonetheless worth noting that the
definition used by the court would render virtually every partnership interest a capital interest.
Because almost every partner has the right to liquidation proceeds in some hypothetical liquida-
tion scenario.
56. Revenue Procedure 93-27, 1993-24 I.R.B. 63, defines a "profits interest" as "a partner-
ship interest other than a capital interest." id. at 64. A "capital interest" is defined as "an
interest that would give the holder a share of the proceeds if the partnership's assets were sold at
fair market value and then the proceeds were distributed in a complete liquidation of the part-
nership. This determination generally is made at the time of receipt of the partnership interest."
Id.
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basis and fair market value of $500,000, and Y is to manage the
apartment building. Thus, initially, X's capital account is $500,000
and Y's is zero. X and Y are to share profits and losses seventy
percent and thirty percent, respectively. Upon immediate liquidation
of the partnership, X would receive $500,000 and Y would receive
nothing. This is because X has a capital interest while Y only has a
profits interest."7
In the event of an immediate liquidation, the service provider would
be in essentially the same position as Y in the example above. There-
fore, in a situation where a service contract is treated as a partnership
for tax purposes, the service provider should be treated as holding a
profits interest in the constructive partnership.
The distinction between the grant of a capital interest and the grant
of a profits interest for services may be the critical threshold question
in determining whether there has been a taxable event. If a taxpayer
receives a capital interest in exchange for services, a taxable event has
occurred and the tax consequences, apart from issues relating to valu-
ation of the interest, are certain. 8 On the other hand, the tax conse-
quences to a taxpayer receiving a profits interest in exchange for
services remain somewhat unsettled. 9 The determination of the nature
of a partnership interest as capital or profits becomes more difficult
where a partner shares in both operating profits and appreciation in
the partnership's assets, but has no other right to share in the partner-
ship's assets in the event of his or her withdrawal or a liquidation.
B. Pre-Diamond Treatment of Receipt of a
Profits Interest for Services
1. Pre-1954 Code Nonrealization
Under pre-1954 law, substantial authority existed for the proposi-
tion that the receipt of a partnership profits interest in exchange for
services was not a taxable event. 60 This authority was based on the
notion that payments by a partnership to a partner for services should
not be treated as compensation, but should instead be treated as dis-
57. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
58. See Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1).
59. See Charles H. Egerton & Richard C. Jans, Partnership Interest for Services: The Plight
of the Service Partner Revisited, I J. PARTNERsHIp Ts x'N 47, 567 (1984).
60. See WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS,
5.0211][c][i] (Supp. 1993); ABA Report, supra note 54, at 228-29.
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tributive shares of partnership income.6 This follows from the prem-
ise that an individual cannot be his or her own employee.6 Thus, a
partner did not realize income when his or her partnership compen-
sated the partner with cash, much less an intangible right to future
profits. 63
The enactment of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code" provides no evi-
dence that Congress intended to modify this rule of nonrealization.
Section 61, defining "gross income," 65 was intended essentially as a
restatement of existing law." The 1954 Code also codified the rules of
partnership taxation as subchapter K. 67 The only rules that in some
way address the tax consequences of a partner's receipt of a partner-
ship interest are set forth in sections 72161 and 707.69
Section 721 codified "the existing case law' 70 that contributions of
property in exchange for partnership interests do not result in income
or loss recognition.7 Congress included section 70772 to address its
concern that the existing blanket rule of no compensation to partners
yielded "unrealistic and unnecessarily complicated" results in certain
circumstances.73 Sections 707(a) and 707(c) provide the only excep-
tions to the no compensation rules. 74 Neither of these sections should
apply where a partner is compensated with a share of partnership
profits."
61. Commissioner v. Moran, 236 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1956); see Armstrong v. Phinney,
394 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1968); Commissioner v. Doak, 234 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1956); Foster v.
United States, 221 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), off'd, 329 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1964); Miller v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 752 (1969) (acq.); Lloyd v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 82 (1929) (acq.);
Estate of Tilton v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 914 (1927) (acq.).
62. Moran, 236 F.2d at 598.
63. See McKEE ET AL., supra note 59, 1 5.02[1][c][i]; ABA Report, supra note 54, at 228.
64. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591, 68A Stat. (1954).
65. I.R.C. § 61 (1992).
66. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A18-A19 (1954); S. REp. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 168-69 (1954).
67. I.R.C. §§ 701-61 (1954).
68. Id. §721.
69. Id. § 707.
70. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A227 (1954); S. REp. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 388 (1954).
71. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 94 (1954).
72. I.R.C. § 707 (1954).
73. H.R. REp. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1954); S. Rap. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 92 (1954).
74. See Pratt v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1977); Foster v. United
States, 329 F.2d 717, 718 (2d Cir. 1964); Miller v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 752, 762 (1969).
75. If the consideration received is an entrepreneurial, sharing interest in the partner-
ship's income, it cannot be received in a nonpartner capacity under § 707(a) ....
Because the value of a profits interest, by definition, cannot be determined 'without
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2. Section 721 and the Regulations
The general nonrecognition rule of section 721(a) provides that
"[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized to a partnership or to any of its
partners in the case of a contribution of property to the partnership in
exchange for an interest in the partnership. 76 However, the regula-
tions limit section 721's grant of nonrecognition: "To the extent that
any of the partners gives up any part of his right to be repaid his
contributions (as distinguished from a share in partnership profits) in
favor of another partner as compensation (or in satisfaction of an ob-
ligation), section 721 does not apply." 7 The parenthetical, "as distin-
guished from a share in partnership profits, ' 78 seems to distinguish
the tax consequences of the exchange of a capital interest for services,
which clearly does not constitute a nonrecognition transaction, from
the tax consequences of the exchange of a profits interest, which argu-
ably does.79
3. The Hale Case
Hale v. Commissioners° confirmed the opinion of many commenta-
tors that the receipt of a profits interest is not a taxable event."' In
that case, Hale Company, a partnership, received a profits interest in
Walnut Company, another partnership, in exchange for its contribu-
tion of future services to Walnut Company.82 Hale Company sold
ninety percent of its profits interest to D-K Investment Corporation
before receiving any income from Walnut Company.83 Hale Company
then reported its proceeds from the sale of its profits interest in Wal-
regard to the income of the partnership,' it cannot, by definition, be a § 707(c) guar-
anteed payment.
McKe ET AL., supra note 59, 5.02[11[c][ii].
76. I.R.C. § 721(a) (1954).
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Hale v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1497, 1502 n.3 (1965); Rev. Rul.
60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174 (as modified by Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100); James 0. Hewitt &
John S. Pennell, GCM Discloses IRS View of Profits Interest for Services, 57 J. TAX'N 91, 91-92
(1982).
80. 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1497 (1965).
81. See id. at 1502 n.3; e.g., Richard L. Levy, Real Estate Partnerships, 16 N.Y.U. INST.
ON FED. TAX'N 183, 193 (1958); Martin J. Rabinowitz, Really Syndication: An Income Tax Pri-
mer for Investor and Promoter, 29 J. TAx'N 92, 97-98 (1968); Jules I. Whitman, How a Partner
Whose Primary Contribution Is Services May Achieve Capital Gain, 22 N.Y.U. INST. OF FED.
TAX'N 653, 663-64 (1964).
82. Hale, 24 T.C.M. at 1500.
83. Id. at 1501.
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nut Company as proceeds from the sale of a capital asset. The court
held that Hale Company realized ordinary income, as if it had re-
ceived such income directly from Walnut Company. 5
For the purposes of this analysis, the significance of Hale is not that
the court characterized the income Hale Company received as ordi-
nary rather than capital; rather, its significance lies in dictum in a
footnote that "[u]nder the regulations, the mere receipt of a partner-
ship interest in future profits does not create any tax liability. Sec.
1.721-1(b), Income Tax Regs. ' '8 6 It is unclear why the Hale court
made such a statement, since the question of whether a taxable event
had occurred when Hale Company received its profits interest was not
before the court. 87
C. Taxable Receipt of a Profits Interest
1. The Diamond Landmark
Six years after Hale, in Diamond v. Commissioner,8" the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the mere
receipt of a profit share with determinable market value is taxable in-
come. 9
The facts in Diamond were as follows: Kargman paid $25,000 for a
buyer's right in a contract for the sale of an office building, and re-
quested that Diamond, a mortgage broker, obtain a mortgage for the
$1.1 million purchase price of the office building.9 They agreed that
Diamond would receive a sixty percent share of the profit or loss of
the venture if he arranged the financing. 9' Diamond obtained a $1.1
million mortgage as Kargman requested, and on January 15, 1961,
Diamond and Kargman entered into a joint venture agreement. 9 The
agreement provided that Kargman would provide all cash needed for
84. Id. at 1502.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1502 n.3.
87. Revenue rulings issued both before and after the Hale decision suggest that the IRS too
believed receipt of a profits interest should not be a taxable event. While the situations consid-
ered involved receipts of profits interests for services, the focus of the rulings was on the timing
of inclusion of the service partner's profit share. The IRS did not comment on the tax conse-
quences of the receipt of the interest itself. See Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100, ex. 5, modify-
ing Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
88. 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'g 56 T.C. 530 (1971).
89. Id. at 291.
90. Id. at 286.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 286-87.
1994] 1139
1140 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:1125
the purchase beyond the mortgage proceeds, and that profits and
losses would be shared, forty percent to Kargman and sixty percent to
Diamond. 93 Upon a sale of the building, however, Kargman would
receive sale proceeds first, to reimburse him for the cash he provided
to purchase the building, and excess proceeds would be split forty/
sixty.94 On February 18, 1962, the partnership closed on the property.
Three weeks later, Diamond assigned his interest in the building for
$40,000 to Kargman, who in turn sold it to Liederman for the same
amount. 95 Diamond reported the $40,000 sale proceeds as a short-term
capital gain, but reported no tax consequences from the receipt of the
interest in the joint venture.9
The Internal Revenue Commissioner (Commissioner) contended
that the profits interest in exchange for services was not within section
721 and was taxable when received under section 61. The Commis-
sioner also determined that Diamond's interest in the partnership had
a market value of $40,000 on February 18, 1962. 91 Diamond argued
that his receipt of a profits interest in the partnership was not a taxa-
ble event and was eligible for nonrecognition under section 721. He
further argued that the subsequent sale produced a capital gain under
section 741.9
The Tax Court found that there is no statute or regulation which
addresses the taxation of the receipt of a profits interest. 99 Despite the
court's conclusion that section 721 and its applicability to a profits
interest is "obscure," the Tax Court went on to hold that "what is
plain is that the regulations do not call for the applicability of section
721 where a taxpayer has performed services for someone who has
compensated him therefor by giving him an interest in a partnership
that came into being at a later date."100
The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the Tax Court's decision, noted
that there is no authority in the Code or regulations that exempts re-
ceipt of a profits interest from taxation. 10 The Seventh Circuit re-
jected Diamond's argument based on Treasury Regulation section
93. Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286, 287 (7th Cir. 1974), affg 56 T.C. 530 (1971).
94. Id.
95. Id. Liederman, however, received only a 5007o interest from Kargman. Id.
96. Id. Diamond had a capital loss carryover that he wanted to use in the year in question.
Id.
97. See id.
98. Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286, 287 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'g 56 T.C. 530 (1971);
see L.R.C. § 741 (1992) (providing the general rule that the character of the gain or loss from the
sale of a partnership interest is capital).
99. Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 530, 544-45 (1971).
100. Id. at 546.
101. Diamond, 492 F.2d at 290.
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1.721-1(b)(1), instead interpreting the regulation as solely determining
the tax consequences to a partner who contributed money or property
for a partnership capital interest but then later assigned a portion of
that interest to a service provider as compensation. 0 2 After consider-
ing the views of commentators, judicial interpretation, legislative his-
tory, administrative interpretation, and policy considerations, the
Seventh Circuit held that there is a taxable event when a service part-
ner's profits interest has a determinable market value. 03
2. Criticism of Diamond
The Diamond decision has been heavily criticized for its lack of
practicality, logic, simplicity, and predictability." 4 The Seventh Cir-
cuit in Diamond acknowledged that "in many if not the typical situa-
tions [a profits interest] will have only speculative value, if any."10
Thus, the court anticipated that the vast majority of profits interests
would not be taxed upon receipt. The court, however, did not find
this reason sufficient to defer taxation of all profits interests. While
this conclusion is at least arguably correct, the court failed to go one
102. Id. at 288-89. The court concluded:
The quoted portion of the regulation may well be read, like § 721, as being directly
addressed only to the consequences of a contribution of money or other property. It
asserts that when a partner making such contributions transfers to another some part
of the contributing partner's right to be repaid, in order to compensate the other for
services or to satisfy an obligation to the other, § 721 does not apply, there is recogni-
tion of gain or loss to the contributing partner, and there is income to the partner who
receives, as compensation for services, part of the right to be repaid.
Id. at 288.
103. Id. at 291. The Seventh Circuit found a "startling degree of unanimity" among the
commentators that the receipt of a profits share for services is not income, id. at 289; one judi-
cial statement on point, in Hale, 24 T.C.M. at 1502 n.3; and "equivocal" legislative history,
Diamond, 492 F.2d at 289-90. The court went on to find no evidence of administrative action
consistent with the Tax Court's decision in Diamond. Id. at 290. Nonetheless, the Seventh Cir-
cuit deferred to the Tax Court's decision that it was sound tax policy to tax the receipt of a
profits share received for services when it is created if it "has a market value capable of determi-
nation." Id. The almost immediate sale of the interest received by Diamond made a determina-
tion of its market value relatively easy. The Seventh Circuit left for resolution through
appropriate regulations the practical problem of avoiding double taxation. Id. Such regulations
still do not exist. See also Finkelman v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1269 (1999). In Fiff-
kelman, the petitioner received a profits interest in a partnership formed by the petitioner in
exchange for securing and investigating real estate for the partnership to purchase. The court
held that petitioner's receipt of a partnership interest in exchange for services constituted a taxa-
ble event. However, the interest had no value here because the partnership purchased the real
estate for substantially more than its value, through non-arm's length bargains, incurred no gen-
uine indebtedness, and did not sell any properties, thus demonstrating the absence of a profit
motive. Id.
104. See WLLis ET AL., supra note 53, § 46.12, at 46-39.
105. Diamond, 492 F.2d at 290.
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step further and consider the ramifications of its holding where the
profits interest has a determinable value..
Critics have stated that the Diamond decision was unnecessarily
broad and controversial. °0 For example, the holding could have been
tailored specifically to situations involving the receipt of a share of
profits for past services, since that was the situation in Diamond.1 7
The Tax Court's decision appears to be so limited. However, the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision does not include such a qualification. Moreo-
ver, the Diamond court could have held that Diamond received a
capital interest.106 Accordingly, the receipt of a capital interest would
have been a taxable event.'°9
Alternatively, the Diamond court could have reached the same re-
sult applying the step transaction doctrine.110 Given the sale of Dia-
mond's interest to his partner only three weeks after he completed the
agreed-upon services,"' it is not difficult to conclude that Diamond
never intended to contribute his services to the partnership. While Di-
amond and Kargman may have structured their deal in the form of a
partnership, in substance the partnership structure was used only to
accomplish the payment of cash to Diamond. The partnership form
was used only to convert ordinary income to capital gain. Had the
Seventh Circuit insisted that Diamond be taxed on the basis of the
substance of the transaction-the payment of ordinary compensation
income-the same result could have been reached without the creation
of an analytically flawed and incomplete precedent.
106. WILLIS ET AL., supra note 53, § 46.06, at 46-12 to -13.
107. Id. Other suggested alternatives to the Diamond approach include following Hale and
taxing the proceeds of the sale of Diamond's interest as ordinary income, or rejecting the pres-
ence of a partnership between Diamond and Kargman altogether. Id.
108. See WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS,
5.02[i][a], at 5-8 (2d ed. 1990); WILLIS ET AL., supra note 53, § 46.06, at 46-13. See also Gen.
Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 23, 1975 and July 25, 1977) (IRS described Diamond's interest as
mostly capital).
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960).
110. Under the step transaction doctrine, for the purposes of determining income tax conse-
quences, "separate steps of an overall transaction will be treated as part of a single transaction if
the steps can fairly be integrated." RICHARD A. WESTIN, SMEPARD's 1990-1991 TAX DICTIONARY
573 (1991). The doctrine has been applied in circumstances where the taxpayer intended the end
result from the outset. See id.; e.g., Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S.
179, 184, 185 (1942); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir. 1965). In Gen.
Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 23, 1975 and July 25, 1977), the IRS noted:
The fact that a future profits interest acquired as compensation for services is sold
shortly after it is acquired may be evidence that the seller of the interest intended to
receive a fixed amount for the services rather than investing the services in the enter-
prise and that, therefore, it was not intended that the seller become a partner.
I 11. Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286, 287 (7th Cir. 1974), affg, 56 T.C. 530 (1971).
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Another subject of debate surrounding Diamond is the import of
the regulations denying nonrecognition under section 721 when a capi-
tal, as opposed to a profits interest is received for services. 1 2 Substan-
tial arguments have been advanced that neither the Tax Court nor the
Seventh Circuit respected Treasury Regulation section 1.721-1(b)(l).",3
The Hale court" 4 recognized the distinction apparently intended by
the Commissioner when the court commented, citing the regulation
under section 721, that "the mere receipt of a partnership interest in
future profits does not create any tax liability.""' The Tax Court in
Diamond appears to have ignored its earlier dictum.
If the value of a profits interest received for services is determined,
and that value is included in income under Diamond, the service part-
ner ends up being taxed twice unless some method for a partnership's
amortization of the value of the interest is developed and the amorti-
zation deductions are specially allocated to the service partner." 6 This
conclusion assumes that the value reflects the present value of the an-
ticipated profits to be earned by the service partner, since the profits
interest can have by its nature no liquidation value." 7 A corollary to
this problem is the effectively double deduction that the non-service
partners would inappropriately enjoy."8
To remedy the double deduction and income problems, the transfer
of the interest could be considered an assignment of income triggering
immediate taxation of the other partners. It would follow that the
service partner would then be deemed to transfer the right to profits
to the partnership in exchange for a partnership interest. That right to
profits would have, in the hands of the partnership, a carryover basis
equal to the income recognized by the service partner. This tax cost
basis could then be amortized by the partnership and the amortization
deductions allocated to the service partner under section 704(b). The
principal problems with this approach are apparent: first, there is no
guidance regarding the appropriate amortization period; and second,
112. See Martin B. Cowan, Receipt of an Interest in Partnership Profits in Consideration for
Services: The Diamond Case, 27 TAx L. REv. 161 (1972); Norman H. Lane, Sol Diamond: The
Tax Court Upsets the Service Partner, 46 S. CAL. L. Rav. 239 (1973).
113. See WILuS ET AL.,supra note 53, § 46.06, at 46-12.
114. Hale v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1497 (1965).
115. Id. at 1502 n.3.
116. See Diamond, 492 F.2d at 289 (citing ARTHuR B. WILLIS, WLtLS ON PARTNERSHIP TAX-
ATION 84-85 (1st ed. 1971)). Willis and his successors continue to maintain the correctness of his
original opinion on this point. See WILIs ET Al.., supra note 53, at § 46.04 (Supp. Dec. 1991).
117. See St. John v. United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9158 (C.D. Il. 1983).
118. The availability of the deduction would be dictated by general principles of income
taxation distinguishing current expenses from capital expenditures.
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the partners are forced to grapple with the complex quagmire of draft-
ing an effective section 704(b) special allocation." 9
3. Post-Diamond Decisions
After Diamond, 120 both the IRS and the judiciary were uncertain of
the scope of its holding. The IRS attempted, without success, to issue
revenue rulings in response to the Diamond case. 2 ' Similarly, judicial
opinions reflected the courts' uncertainty. 122 Moreover, the Eighth
Circuit's decision in Campbell v. Commissioner23 will only produce
further uncertainty.
The IRS on two occasions, in 1975 and 1977, considered issuing a
revenue ruling with a fact pattern similar to that of Diamond.2 4 The
1975 proposal concluded that the fair market value of a profits inter-
est received for services is includable in gross income if it is received as
compensation for the services performed for an individual, as op-
posed to the partnership. 2' The ruling was issued without "further
discussion of the alternative positions available."'' 26 The 1977 pro-
posed Revenue Ruling 27 concluded that in both Diamond and the hy-
pothetical considered in the ruling, the service partner received a
capital interest represented by the service partner's right to share in
the unrealized appreciation inherent in the partnership's property, as
119. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (as amended in 1991); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-IT (as
amended in 1989); LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 81 (2d ed. 1988).
120. 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
121. See, e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 23, 1975 and July 25, 1977).
122. See Kessler v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 624 (1982). The Kessler court com-
mented in a footnote that if the service provider and the service recipient were determined to
have formed a partnership,
we would be faced with the question of how to characterize amounts received from a
partnership profits interest, which interest was received in exchange for services, and
which interest had an unascertainable value on the date of receipt. The resolution of
this knotty problem was left somewhat unanswered in Diamond and raises conceptual
difficulties which directly stem from the operation of the provisions of Subchapter K.
Id. at 628 n. 16 (citation omitted).
123. 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
124. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 23, 1975 and July 25, 1977); WILIs ET AL., supra
note 53, § 46.07, at 46-13 to -14.
125. Gen. Couns. Mer. 36,346, at 1 (July 23, 1975 and July 25, 1977).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 8-15. The facts of the 1977 proposed ruling were as follows: A purchased a con-
tract to acquire real estate for $10,000. B was to obtain 100% financing for the property in
exchange for a 25% interest in profits and losses of partnership AB. Upon a sale, the proceeds
would be applied first to any outstanding mortgage, then $10,000 would be paid to A, and the
remainder would be allocated, 75% to A and 25% to B. The property was purchased in the
names of A and B for $300,000 and shortly thereafter was contributed to partnership AB. The
property was valued at $360,000 once financing had been arranged. Within a year, B sold his
partnership interest for $15,000. Id. at 8-10.
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determined by the property's appraised value immediately after it was
purchased.' 2s The proposed ruling went on to reject Diamond to the
extent that it is read to hold that receipt by a partner of a profits
interest as compensation for services gives rise to taxable income. 2 9
The General Counsel Memorandum accompanying the proposed
1977 ruling limits the term "profits interests" to interests giving the
holder no right to existing partnership assets upon a liquidation of the
holder's interest.'10 Moreover, the General Counsel Memorandum and
proposed ruling stress the need to distinguish when an individual re-
ceives a right to future profits as an employee or independent contrac-
tor, rather than as a partner.' 3' The right to future profits alone is
insufficient to categorize the recipient as a joint venturer or partner
for tax purposes. All the facts and circumstances must be considered
to determine whether the individual intended to invest his services in
the enterprise. The proximate sale of the profits interest, as in Dia-
mond, would be an indication that the requisite investment intent is
absent. The compensatory receipt of an interest in future profits by
someone who is not a partner is not an event triggering income reali-
zation. Compensation income arises as profits are received or when
there is a disposition of the interest.'32
The 1977 proposed ruling concludes by treating the Diamond-like
partnership interest as a capital interest, the value of which was to be
included in income.' IRS's failure to issue either of the proposed rul-
ings or any other revenue rulings or regulations until the summer of
1993 probably reflects internal skepticism regarding the correct scope
of Diamond's application.
The desire of the IRS and the courts to avoid addressing the Dia-
mond issue has been revealed on many occasions. Primarily, three ap-
proaches have been employed to avoid dealing directly with Diamond:
(1) framing the issue as whether the service provider is an employee
versus a partner; (2) focusing on the absence of value of the profits
128. Id. at 12, 15. The IRS concluded that B had received a capital interest to the extent of
his share in the unrealized appreciation in the value of the property when he received his interest
and should therefore recognize income of $12,500 (($360,000 - $300,000 - $10,000) x 25%). B's
adjusted basis would include the $12,500 recognized on receipt of his interest. Upon the sale of
his interest, B would recognize gain to the extent the amount realized exceeded the adjusted basis
of his interest in partnership AB, $2,500 ($15,000 - $12,500). Id. at 15.
129. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,346, at 12 (July 23, 1975 and July 25, 1977).
130. Id. at 5.
131. Id. at 7-8, 14-15. The IRS stressed, however, that focusing only on whether the taxpayer
rendered services as a partner would inappropriately "place a premium on whether the partner-
ship is formed before or after the services are rendered." Id. at 2-3.
132. Id. at 12-14.
133. Id. at 15.
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interest; or (3) characterizing the service provider's contribution as
property within the meaning of section 721 .'3
Wheeler v. Commissioner'" provides an example of the first ap-
proach, employee versus partner. 3 6 In that case, Wheeler was in the
real estate development and construction business. 37 Perrault was to
provide financing for a number of projects that Wheeler was pursu-
ing. 3 They agreed that profits would be divided seventy-five percent
to Perrault and twenty-five percent to Wheeler after Perrault recov-
ered his investment, plus a six percent interest factor. 19 Wheeler was
also to receive a monthly salary.14° Some of the properties that
Wheeler and Perrault obtained were later sold at a profit.1 4'
The Commissioner argued that Wheeler was not a partner but an
employee of Perrault and should be taxed on his share of the profit as
ordinary income. 42 Wheeler insisted that he was a joint venturer, and
therefore the gains from the sale of the properties were taxable as cap-
ital gains. 141
The Tax Court concluded that a joint venture taxable as a partner-
ship existed and that Wheeler was entitled to report his share of profit
as capital gain.'" Thus, the controversy in Wheeler was resolved with-
134. Another alternative would be to treat Diamond as if it involved a capital interest. See,
e.g., Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 703 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'g 74 T.C.
,939 (1980). In National Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1223 (1986), the court
focused on whether the taxpayer had received a capital interest or a profits interest, concluding it
had not received either, since it had received no economic benefit. Id. at 1228-29. Here, the IRS
stipulated that a profits interest was not taxable. See id.
In Kobor v. United States, 88-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 1 9477 (C.D. Cal. 1987), the IRS took the
position that the profits interest was taxable, but the court avoided the difficult Diamond issues
when it concluded that the interest should not be taxed because it was not freely transferable and
was subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. Id. In dicta, the court went on to note the specula-
tive value of the profits interest, taking into consideration that it was subordinate to the capital
interests and that it was held subject to the taxpayer's rendition of future services. Id.
135. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 883 (1978).
136. Kessler v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 624 (1982), also framed the issue as em-
ployee versus partner.
137. Wheeler, 37 T.C.M. at 884.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. Wheeler's duties included supervising construction, hiring subcontractors, approv-
ing payrolls, paying for materials, approving change orders and approving interim payments to
subcontractors. Id. at 885. Wheeler also assisted in the preparation of financial materials needed
to secure certain loans and selected architects and subcontractors jointly with Perrault. Id.
141. Id.
142. Wheeler v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 883, 886 (1978).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 891. In reaching its conclusion, the Wheeler court used a federal tax standard
rather than state law standards for determining whether a joint venture exists. See id. at 887-89.
The court then sought to determine whether the parties intended to form a joint venture, taking
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out the Commissioner having to contend that Wheeler received a taxa-
ble profits interest. 141 Nowhere in the Wheeler opinion did the court
even cite the Diamond case, despite the similarity of facts.
St. John v. United States illustrates the second approach, focusing
on the absence of value. 46 The facts of that case were as follows: A
partnership was formed to operate a nursing home. St. John received
a fifteen percent partnership interest in exchange for past and future
services.1 47 The other partners contributed $170,000. Their partnership
agreement stated that upon liquidation of the partnership, St. John
would not receive anything until the other partners had recovered
their initial contributions.14
The district court first concluded that St. John had received a prof-
its interest, because he had no right to, or interest in, partnership capi-
tal on the date his interest was no longer forfeitable. The court held
that since the nursing home's financial forecast was uncertain, St.
into consideration their agreement, their conduct, their method of profit and loss sharing, their
use of the name "Perrault and Wheeler" when doing business, their tax treatment of the sales
proceeds as joint venturers (although compensation treatment of amounts paid to Wheeler
would have been more favorable to Perrault), and their proper maintenance of the venture's
books of account. Id. at 889-91.
145. Characterization of payments was the focus again in Revenue Ruling 77-84, 1977-1 C.B.
173, where coal royalties were received for services. The taxability of the receipt of the royalty
interest was not discussed.
146. 84-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9158 (C.D. Ill. 1983). The Tax Court also used this approach in
Kenroy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1749 (1984), which held that Kenroy, Inc.
received no income upon its receipt of a profits interest because the interest, as valued by the net
assets of the partnership less the limited partners' contribution, was worthless when acquired. Id.
at 1758. In a footnote, the Tax Court distinguished Diamond because there the contemporane-
ous sale of the profits interest proved its value upon receipt. See id. at 1758 n.8. See also Finkel-
man v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1269 (1989) (petitioner received a profits interest in a
partnership (formed by petitioner) in exchange for securing and investigating real estate for the
partnership to purchase. The court held that petitioner's receipt of a partnership interest in ex-
change for services constituted a taxable event; however, the interest had no real value because
the partnership purchased the real estate for substantially more than its value, through non-
arm's length bargains, incurring no genuine indebtedness, and did not sell any properties, thus
demonstrating the absence of a profit motive). But see Larson v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1637 (1988) (petitioner, general partner who provided managerial services for the partner-
ship, was entitled to fees of $35,000, but unilaterally opted to receive a capital interest. The court
rejected the following arguments advanced by petitioner to show that his interest had no value
upon receipt: (1) partnership's assets had no value since they were held by seller and not yet paid
for; (2) petitioner was liable for return of investor's cash until partnership articles properly filed;
and (3) his receipt of the interest was not at arm's length. The court looked to price of partner-
ship units ($10,000/unit), failure to file articles was not unreasonable, loans secured by partner-
ship assets not yet in default, and petitioner's interest not subject to substantfal risk of forfeiture
under Code section 83).
147. St. John v. United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9158 (C.D. I1. 1983). St. John's
interest was subject to forfeiture if he failed to perform the required services during the eight-
month period following formation of the partnership. Id.
148. Id.
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John's profits interest should be valued at its liquidation value. The
court further held that because St. John would not receive any pro-
ceeds upon liquidation of the partnership, he did not have to recog-
nize any income upon receipt of his profits interest. The court
distinguished Diamond because in that case the quick sale of the inter-
est clearly proved value.' 4 9
The St. John court correctly looked to liquidation value to deter-
mine whether St. John received a profits interest or capital interest.11
A clearer line of authority would have developed in this area, how-
ever, had the St. John court applied the Diamond standard of deter-
minable market value, rather than liquidation value, in concluding
that the receipt of St. John's profits interest was not a taxable event.
Notwithstanding the court's use of the wrong standard, it correctly
decided that St. John's profits interest had no value at the date he
received it, and therefore it did not give rise to taxable income. Using
liquidation value to determine both whether there is a profits interest
and what that interest is worth, however, results in the receipt of a
profits interest never giving rise to taxable income.
The third approach to skirting the Diamond issue, characterizing
the service provider's contribution as property, was used in Stafford
v. United States.'5 ' The issue in Stafford arose from Stafford's receipt
of a limited partnership interest in exchange for his assignment to the
partnership of a letter of intent from an insurance company to finance
the construction of a hotel.'52 In the two district court and two appel-
late court decisions in Stafford, no determination was made as to
whether the interest received by Stafford was a profits or a capital
interest," 3 and there was no mention of Diamond. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit finally concluded that an
unenforceable letter of intent could be property and that this letter
was property within the meaning of section 721.154 All that remained
was to determine the value of the partnership interest and of the letter
149. Id.
150. WILLIS ET AL., supra note 53, § 46.07, at 46-16 to -18.
151. 435F. Supp. 1036 (M.D. Ga. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 611 F.2d 990 (Sth Cir. 1980),
on remand, 552 F. Supp 311 (M.D. Ga. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 727 F.2d 1043 (11th Cir.
1984). In Dillon v. United States, 84-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 1 9921 (S.D. Tex. 1981), the right to a
partnership interest in A, which was contributed to partnership B for an interest in B, was prop-
erty, even though the right B received was in exchange for B's services. Id.
152. Stafford, 435 F. Supp. at 1037-38. Stafford was also the general partner and was paid a
salary for his supervisory services. Id. at 1038. All of Stafford's efforts to secure the letter of
intent occurred before the partnership was formed and were on his own account. Id.
153. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
154. 727 F.2d at 1051-54.
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in order to establish whether part of the interest was received for serv-
ices. '
D. The Enactment of Section 83
Section 83 was added to the Internal Revenue Code by the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969.156 Thus, it should be noted at the outset that the
applicability of section 83 to the transfer of a profits interest for serv-
ices was not at issue in Diamond.5 7 It was, however, potentially appli-
cable to the transactions considered in the post-Diamond decisions
discussed above.'58 In Kobor v. United States,'5 9 where the taxpayer
received a profits interest in exchange for future services, the district
court employed the standards concerning transfer restrictions and a
substantial risk of forfeiture that appear in section 83 to conclude that
the interest was not taxable, but the court did not even mention sec-
tion 83.160 It was not until the Tax Court decision in Campbell v.
Commissioner 61 that the effect of section 83 on a transfer of a profits
interest for services was explored.
Section 83(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
If, in connection with the performance of services, property is
transferred to any person other than the person for whom such
services are performed, the excess of-
(1) the fair market value of such property (determined without
regard to any restriction other than a restriction which by its
terms will never lapse) at the first time the rights of the person
having the beneficial interest in such property are transferable
or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever
occurs earlier, over
(2) the amount (if any) paid for such property, shall be
included in the gross income of the person who performed such
services in the first taxable year in which the rights of the
person having the beneficial interest in such property are
transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture, whichever is applicable. The preceding sentence
shall not apply if such person sells or otherwise disposes of
155. Id. at 1054-55.
156. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 588 (1969).
157. See LIND ET AL., supra note 119, at 80-81. The reason why applicability of section 83
was not contested in Diamond is that section 83 applies to transfers occurring after June 30,
1969, and the transfer in Diamond was executed in 1962.
158. See supra notes 135-55 and accompanying text.
159. 88-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9477 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
160. Id.
161. 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236 (1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
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such property in an arm's length transaction before his rights in
such property become transferable or not subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture. 62
In determining whether section 83(a) applies to a transfer. of a prof-
its interest, the threshold question is whether the profits interest is
property for the purposes of section 83. Treasury Regulation section
1.83-3(e) defines property as "real and personal property other than
either money or an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money or
property in the future."'' 63 Accordingly, the issue here is whether a
profits interest more closely resembles an unfunded and unsecured
promise to pay money in the future than it does personal property.
Once it is determined that the service provider and the proprietor are
partners for tax purposes, rather than merely parties to an employ-
ment contract, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to argue that
the service provider's interest is simply a promise to pay. 164
If a profits interest is property within the meaning of section 83(a),
the tax consequences of its receipt in exchange for services appear to
be dictated by section 83. The regulations provide that section 83 ap-
plies regardless of whether property is received for past, present or
future services. 65 The same regulation suggests, however, that section
83's application is limited to circumstances where the service provider
receives his or her interest as "an employee or an independent con-
tractor."6
If section 83 does apply to the receipt of a profits interest and the
interest is substantially vested, 67 under section 83 it is taxable upon
receipt. 68  The interest is substantially vested if it is freely
transferablee" or not subject to substantial risk of forfeiture. 70 Con-
162. I.R.C. §83(a) (1992).
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985).
164. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (providing that a compensatory transfer of a part-
nership interest is a transfer of property for the purposes of section 83). A partnership interest is
personal property. Uzrq. PARTmERSmp AcT § 29, 7 U.L.P.A. 29 (1914).
165. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(f) (as amended in 1985).
166. Id.
167. Treasury Regulation section 1.83-3(b) provides: "Property is substantially vested for
such purposes when it is either transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture."
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(b) (as amended in 1985).
168. See I.R.C. § 83(a) (1992); WILLS ET AL., supra note 53, § 46.09, at 46-20 to -21.
169. Code section 83(c)(2) provides: "The rights of a person in property are transferable
only if the rights in such property of any transferee are not subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture."
170. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1) (1992); see id. § 83(c)(l)-(2). Treasury Regulation section 1.83-3(c)
provides:
[Wihether a risk of forfeiture is substantial .. .depends upon the facts and circum-
PAR TNERSHIP PROFIT INTERESTS
versely, if a transfer restriction is placed on a profits interest and there
is a substantial risk of forfeiture of the interest, the interest is not
vested and a taxable event does not occur until the restriction or risk
of forfeiture lapses, unless the service partner makes an election under
section 83(b) to accelerate the taxable event to the date of receipt. 7 ,
Moreover, unless a section 83(b) election is made, regulations provide
that the transferor of property that is not vested (here the partnership
interest) is deemed to remain the owner until the property vests.'72 Un-
til the property vests, any amount of income received by its holder is
considered taxable compensation income in the taxable year of re-
ceipt. 7  If the profits interest is substantially vested or a section 83(b)
election is made, section 83 clearly requires that the interest be valued
and that value be included in income regardless of how difficult valua-
tion may be.' 7
4
From the perspective of the proprietor, as the other partner in the
constructive partnership, if section 83 applies, the partnership, subject
to limitations on the deductibility of business expenses requiring that
certain expenses be capitalized, generally may deduct under section
162'"7 the amount included in income by the service provider when
such amount is so included. 7 6 The proprietor should then benefit
from the deduction. 177 If the deduction is postponed, or the expense
amortized, an effective special allocation would have to be agreed
upon by the venturers if the proprietor is to receive the entire tax ben-
efit.
E. Theories as to the Taxation of a Profits Interest
Prior to the decision in Campbell v. Commissioner, 7 there were
essentially four alternative theories advocated to determine the tax
stances. A substantial risk of forfeiture exists where rights in property that are trans-
ferred are conditioned, directly or indirectly, upon the future performance (or
refraining from performance) of substantial services by any person, or the occurrence
of a condition related to a purpose of the transfer, and the possibility of forfeiture is
substantial if such condition is not satisfied.
171. See I.R.C. § 83(b) (1992). By making a section 83(b) election within 30 days after the
date of such transfer, a partner will be taxed on the value of his or her interest in the year of the
transfer. The timing of income inclusion is also accelerated when an interest that has not vested
is disposed of in an arm's length transaction. Id. § 83(a).
172. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(l) (as amended in 1978).
173. Id.
174. Contrast this with the Diamond standard for determinable market value. See Diamond
v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286, 290 (7th Cir. 1974).
175. Code section 162(a)(1) allows a deduction for "reasonable . . . compensation for per-
sonal services actually rendered" so long as the expense constitutes an ordinary and necessary
trade or business expense. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1992).
176. See I.R.C. § 83(h) (1992); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a) (as amended in 1978).
177. See, e.g., McDougal v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 720 (1974).
178. 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236 (1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
19941
1152 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:1125
consequences of the receipt of a partnership interest in exchange for
services: a nontaxable event; a case-by-case approach; the application
of section 83; or the American Bar Association's proposal (ABA pro-
posal).' 79 After Campbell, the American Bar Association released a
report (ABA report) modifying its recommended approach, and the
IRS released Revenue Procedure 93-27 180 stating its position concern-
ing the taxation of receipt of a profits interest for services. Each of
these theories will be discussed in turn below.
1. Nontaxable Event
The most favorable tax treatment for a service provider's receipt of
a profits interest is not to tax him or her upon receipt at all.' 8' The
Hale court chose this approach when it interpreted Treasury Regula-
tion section 1.721-1(b)(1) to mean that "the mere receipt of a partner-
ship interest in future profits does not create any tax liability."'8 2 The
service provider then would simply be taxed on his or her share of
profits when earned by the constructive partnership. To the extent
that the partnership profits are allocated and taxed to the service pro-
vider, the amount of profits taxed to the proprietor is reduced, almost
as if the proprietor had been allocated a business expense deduction
for having paid the service provider compensation. Problems of dou-
ble taxation and double deduction are eliminated.
Policy reasons favoring a nontaxable event include "[llogic, practi-
cality, simplicity, and predictability of results."' The primary objec-
tion to this approach is that a service provider will escape taxation on
the value of the profits interest received for services until there is a
taxable disposition. This approach, moreover, may result not only in
substantial deferral of income, but also in conversion of what would
179. American Bar Association Section of Taxation, Committee on Partnerships, Proposal
to Amend the Regulations under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Define a Partnership
Capital Interest and a Partnership Profits Interest, and to Clarify the Tax Treatment of Com-
pensatory Transfers of Both Forms of Partnership Interests (Apr. 28, 1987) [hereinafter ABA
Proposal], reprinted in 87 TAx NoTEs TODAY 91-24 (May 11, 1987); excerpt reprinted in Lirm Er
AL., supra note 119, at 82-87.
180. 1993-24 I.R.B. 63; see discussion infra part II.G.
181. This method was rejected by the Diamond court. The court did not reject completely
the proposition that Treasury Regulation section 1.721-1(b)(1) could have some relevance in this
area, but chose only not to apply it to the facts of the Diamond case, where the partnership
interest was received for services previously rendered, not future services, and the interest argua-
bly was a capital rather than a profits interest. See Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th
Cir. 1974).
182. Hale v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1947, 1502 n.3 (1965); see supra text accom-
panying notes 79-86.
183. WILLIS ET AL., supra note 53, § 46.12, at 46-38.
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otherwise be ordinary income (the service provider's compensation in-
come) into capital gain.' u
2. Case-by-Case Approach
Another approach to the taxation of a profits interest received in
exchange for services is the case-by-case analysis. This approach was
applied in the landmark decision of Diamond v. Commissioner,85 dis-
cussed supra, which held the receipt of a profit share with determina-
ble market value is income. 8 6
A major problem with this approach is that each case would have to
be decided on its own merits, taking into account all the relevant facts
and circumstances. 87 Some of the factors used to determine whether a
taxable event has occurred include "whether the interest could be val-
ued, whether it was in exchange for past or future services, and
whether it could be transferred by the service partner. '" 8 This ap-
proach is likely to give rise to unpredictability and inconsistency of
results. 389
Moreover, if the profits interest is included in income upon receipt
because it has a determinable market value, it would appear that the
service provider, to the extent of the value that was based on the value
of the future income stream, is going to be taxed twice when the part-
nership earns income. Neither the courts nor the IRS has provided
guidelines to alleviate this problem. In addition, to the extent that the
proprietor deducts the value from income and then allocates partner-
ship income to the service provider, there is a double benefit to the
proprietor.
3. Application of Section 83
Application of section 83 to the taxation of a profits interest re-
ceived in exchange for services creates even greater practical and con-
184. The maximum tax rate on net capital gains is 28%. I.R.C. § 1(h) (1992). Since the top
rate on noncorporate taxpayers' ordinary income for 1993 was 9.601o, characterization of income
has renewed importance.
185. 56 T.C. 530 (1971), affd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974); see discussion supra part 1I.C.1.
186. 492 F.2d at 291.
187. This approach could lead to a judicial nightmare and is certain to result in a planning
nightmare.
188. WILIs ET AL., supra note 53, § 46.13.
189. See McKEE ET A.L., supra note 108, 15.02(1]; WItLIs ET AL., supra note 53, § 46.13.
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ceptual problems than does the case-by-case approach. 90 If the profits
interest is either not forfeitable or is transferrable, then under section
83(a) its value will be included in the service provider's income upon
receipt.1 91 Where the venture is so speculative that the interest is deter-
mined to have no value, there is no problem; there is no income or
deduction. To the extent that the interest has value, and therefore the
amount of that value is included in the service provider's income and
deducted from the proprietor's income, the same problems as dis-
cussed above in the case-by-case approach arise. The problems with
applying section 83 are potentially exacerbated where the interest is
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture and is not transferable. This
is likely to be the case in virtually every service contract characterized
as a partnership for tax purposes, because the service provider gener-
ally receives an interest in profits in exchange for rendering future
services. In such circumstances, the profits interest is generally non-
transferable and forfeitable if at any time during the life of the con-
structive partnership the service provider no longer renders services. 92
In the absence of a section 83(b) election, 93 the value of the profits
interest would have to be included in the service provider's income
whenever the interest becomes vested.194 In the context of a construc-
tive partnership, it is unlikely that such an election would be timely
made (unless done as a protective measure), since the service provider
would not likely consider himself or herself an individual who re-
ceived property for services when he or she entered into the service
contract. 195
In the absence of a section 83(b) election, there are two possible
ways to analyze the effect of such a nonterminating forfeiture provi-
sion. One argument is that the risk of forfeiture never lapses. This
190. See WILLIS ET AL., supra note 53, § 46.14.
There seems to be no logical reason for applying § 83 to the receipt of a profits inter-
est by a service partner in exchange for services. There is no substantial harm to the
government or undue advantage to the partners if there is no tax assessed at that time.
Conversely, by applying § 83, there is undue hardship to the service partner and undue
benefit to the other partners with little, if any, effect on the revenue.
Id. § 46.10, at 46-33 to -34.
191. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1992).
192. See Kobor v. United States, 88-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 1 9477 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (finding,
without citing I.R.C. § 83, that a profits interest granted in exchange for future services was
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture and that requiring a majority of the limited partners'
consent to a transfer made the interest not freely transferable).
193. I.R.C. § 83(b) (permitting an election to include immediately in income a property in-
terest that is not vested).
194. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
195. The section 83(b) election must be made no later than 30 days after the date of receipt
of the partnership interest. See I.R.C. § 83(b)(2).
PAR TNERSHIP PROFIT INTERESTS
would yield the same results as the nontaxable event approach dis-
cussed above. Alternatively, however, one could argue that a lapse oc-
curs each time the service provider becomes entitled to a share of
profits, at least with respect to some portion of the profits interest.
This analysis is supported by the fact that at the end of each period
for which the service provider receives his or her profits share, he or
she has received everything to which he or she is entitled for that pe-
riod as a profits partner.196 At this point, the question becomes how
much must be included in the service provider's income in addition to
his or her share of profits. Perhaps the service provider must include
the value of the portion of the profits interest as to which the risk of
forfeiture has lapsed. This may be determined by reference to the
amount of profit the service provider received and taking into account
the nonterminating transfer restriction, 197 resulting in immediate dou-
ble taxation of the service provider and double benefit to the proprie-
tor.
Regardless of which analysis applies, as long as the profits interest
of the service provider is not vested, under Treasury Regulation sec-
tion 1.83-1(a)(1) the service provider presumably will not be consid-
ered the owner of the interest for tax purposes until it vests. This, in
turn, triggers a whole series of potential problems, such as the follow-
ing:
1. [T]he service partner's distributive share of profits and losses must
be reallocated to the other partners, even though the economic
benefit or detriment associated with such profits or losses is
personally borne by the service partner.
2. All cash distributions from the partnership to the service partner
will presumably be taxed to him as ordinary income rather than
being subject to the normal distribution rules of section 731.
3. When the service partner's interest becomes vested and he is
recognized as a partner for tax purposes, the remaining partners may
be deemed to have received a constructive cash distribution under
section 752(b) if the partnership has liabilities, even though the
service partner may have been liable for his allocable share of
partnership debt from and after the time he originally received his
partnership interest.
4. If the service partner happens to be the sole general partner of a
limited partnership, the partnership could conceivably fail to qualify
196. Contrast this with the case of a forfeitable capital interest. A capital partner with a
forfeitable interest may get current profits, but his or her right to partnership capital may be
continuously at risk.
197. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1).
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as a true partnership under section 7701 and the regulations
thereunder due to the lack of at least one general partner. 19
While such an absurd result could not have been intended when sec-
tion 83 was enacted,' 99 this analysis demonstrates the incompatibility
of section 83 and subchapter K.200
The major advantage of the section 83 approach is its consistent tax
treatment of all types of property. 20' The benefit of consistency, how-
ever, is often outweighed by the deficiency of logic and practicality
when section 83 is applied in this situation. 2 2
4. ABA Proposal and Report
In 1987, the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Taxation
proposed certain amendments to the regulations under sections 83 and
721 of the Code to clarify the tax consequences of the compensatory
transfer of a partnership profits interest. The 1987 ABA proposal in-
cludes a definition that would treat as a profits interest any partner-
ship interest where the partner does not have the right with respect to
the interest "to share in the proceeds of a sale of the partnership's
assets for their fair market values at the time of receipt of such inter-
est. '" 20 Under the ABA proposal, a transfer of a profits interest for
services would not be taxed so long as the services were rendered in
the service partner's capacity as a partner. 2°4 This approach would
eliminate, in many cases, the problems of double taxation and valua-
tion associated with inclusion of a profits interest in income. The
premise for the proposed amendments is that a partnership profits in-
terest is "arguably analogous to an unfunded, unsecured promise to
pay deferred compensation . . "201 Nonetheless, the 1987 ABA pro-
posal goes on to recommend that the value of a profits interest re-
198. LIND ET AL., supra note 119, at 82-83.
199. See WILLS ET AL., supra note 53, § 46.12.
200. Treasury Regulation section 1.83-3(f)'s reference to an employee or independent con-
tractor receiving property as compensation suggests that section 83 was not intended to apply to
a partner's receipt of property. Moreover, the legislative history of section 83 nowhere mentions
receipt of a profits interest, the tax consequences of which were understood to be controlled by
subchapter K prior to the enactment of section 83. See Jeffrey M. Paravano, Receipt of a Part-
nership Profits Interest in Consideration for Services Rendered-Life After Campbell, 44 TAx
LAW. 529, 545 (1991).
201. WILUS ET AL., supra note 53, § 46.14.
202. Id.; see supra notes 156-75 and accompanying text.
203. ABA Proposal, supra note 179, at 9.
204. Id. at 13. Such nonrecognition treatment would apply even when an interest of this type
vests. Id. at 14.
205. Id. at 13.
PARTNERSHIP PROFIT INTERESTS
ceived for services rendered other than in one's capacity as a partner
should be included in income unless the interest is not vested.206 A
restricted interest would be included in the service partner's income
when the interest vests. 7 Regardless of whether the interest is vested,
however, the partner would be recognized as a partner.208 Thus, the
rules converting the distributive share of the partner whose interest is
not vested to ordinary income would be inapplicable. 2° 9
From the partnership's standpoint, to correspond with the treat-
ment of the service partner, the ABA proposed that no deduction be
allowed to, or capital expenditure be deemed made by, the partnership
where the transfer of the profits interest is nontaxable. 10 Under the
rules in Treasury Regulation section 1.83-6(a), any deduction would
be allowed and any capital expenditure required to be capitalized . 2
Finally, under the 1987 ABA proposal, no gain or loss would be
recognized by the partnership when a nontaxable transfer is made. '
A taxable transfer, however, would be treated as an anticipatory as-
signment of income in the amount of the fair market value of the
interest."' The partnership, having no basis in this profits interest,
would therefore recognize income in the amount of this value.2 1 4 To
offset the service partner's double taxation problem, the ABA pro-
posed that the profits interest be treated as an intangible asset trans-
ferred to the service partner and then constructively recontributed to
the partnership and eligible for amortization over a sixty-month pe-
riod." 5 Such amortization deductions would be specially allocated to
the service partner.216
The 1987 ABA proposal does address some of the problems associ-
ated with the other theories of taxation, such as the need for relief
from double taxation and the uncertainty as to the applicability of
206. id. at 14.
207. Id. at 7, 14; supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
208. ABA Proposal, supra note 179, at 14.
209. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
210. ABA Proposal, supra note 179, at 14.
211. Id. Treasury Regulation section 1.83-6(a) (1978) provides the general rule:
In the case of a transfer of property in connection with the performance of services, or
a compensatory cancellation of a nonlapse restriction . . . a deduction is allowable
under sections 162 or 212, to the person for whom such services were performed. The
amount of the deduction is equal to the amount includable as compensation in the
gross income of the service provider ... but only to the extent such amount meets the
requirements of sections 162 or 212 and the regulations thereunder.
212. ABA Proposal, supra note 179, at 14.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 14-15.
216. Id. at 15; see I.R.C. §§ 704(b)-(c).
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section 83. It does not, however, address all of the problems discussed
above that arise from either nontaxability or immediate inclusion.
Moreover, it would add yet another uncertainty: the determination of
whether a service provider performed services in his or her capacity as
a partner. This standard is used to determine the tax consequences
when a partner receives payments for services or the use of property
that are not tied to partnership profits." 7 There is ample history in-
volving interpretation of the section 707(a) standard for determining
whether the services performed were in one's capacity as a partner,
and often some fine distinctions are required. 218 It seems unnecessary
to inject the additional complexity attendant to the application of the
section 707(a) standard into an already complex area. It is also diffi-
cult to rationalize connecting the determination as to taxability to the
capacity in which the partner's services are rendered. For example, the
use of this standard would assure that whenever services are per-
formed before the partnership is formed, the receipt of the profits in-
terest is a taxable event. 1 9 One cannot perform in his or her capacity
as a partner when there is no partnership. This would have nothing to
do with the nature of the services performed, the focus of the distinc-
tion attempted in section 707(a). The 1987 ABA proposal merely as-
serted that this standard is consistent with section 707(a)(2)(A) and
provides a "more important" criteria for taxability than other pro-
posals. 220
Five years later, after the Tax Court and Eighth Circuit rendered
their opinions in Campbell, discussed infra,221 the ABA Section of
Taxation reconsidered its position regarding the tax consequences of
the receipt of a profits interest for services. On October 22, 1992, the
ABA Section of Taxation released a report recommending that in al-
most all cases the receipt of a profits interest in exchange for services
217. See I.R.C. §§ 707(a), (c). Both sections determine the characterization of payments re-
ceived for services depending upon whether or not the partner was acting in his capacity as a
partner.
218. See, e.g., Sorrell v. Commissioner, 89-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9521 (11th Cir. 1989); Pratt
v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1977); Rev. Rul. 83-155, 1983-2 C.B. 38; Rev. Rul. 81-
301, 1981-2 C.B. 144.
Section 707(a)'s legislative history tells us to look at "all the facts and circumstances" to
determine whether "a payment [was made] to a partner acting in his non-partner capacity."
STAFF OF SENATE Comm. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 2D Sass., EXPLANATION OF THE PROVISIONS
APPROVED BY THE CoMMITrE ON MARcH 21, 1984 226 (Comm. Print 1984). It also provides a
list of six factors to consider and several examples. Id. at 227-30.
219. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 23, 1975 and July 25, 1977); supra notes 124-33
and accompanying text.
220. ABA Proposal, supra note 179, at 13.
221. See discussion infra part II.F.
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be treated as a nonrealization eventYm The ABA report also includes a
proposed definition of profits interest that uses a "liquidation ap-
proach" to distinguish a profits from a capital interest. 23 Finally, the
report includes a recommendation that when a profits interest must be
included in income an "all factors" valuation method should be used
to determine the includable amount. 4
In support of its recommendation that the receipt of a profits inter-
est for services generally be treated as a nonrealization event, the ABA
Section of Taxation relied on the substantial body of pre-1954 law .22s
The report also considered the absence of indicia, other than the in-
clusion of Code sections 707(a) and (c),2as that Congress intended,
when it promulgated the 1954 Code, to change the existing law con-
222. ABA Report, supra note 54.
223. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
224. ABA Report, supra note 54, at 463. The ABA report acknowledges that existing case
law, with the exception of Campbell, has used the "liquidation method" to value profits inter-
ests. See id.; supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text. Using the ABA's proposed definition of
profits interest with this valuation method would always result in a determination of no value.
See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. The ABA report concludes that this would not be
"good tax policy." ABA Report, supra, at 469.
Under the "all factors" approach, many unique factors associated with the value of a profits
interest are weighed to determine value. A profits interest in a new business generally would have
no value, while one in an established business with proven earning capacity may have an ascer-
tainable value. Id. at 469. Trading of interests in a secondary market would have substantial
weight in the valuation process. In addition, the following list of valuation factors would be
taken into account:
(a) The presence or absence of voting or management rights attributable to the interest
received.
(b) The rights of the holders of such interests to compel partnership distributions, the
dissolution of the partnership and the sale of partnership assets. In the absence of a
provision contained in the partnership agreement requiring the distribution of cash,
the valuation should also take note of the possibility that the managing partner may
withhold distributions of partnership profits even though the service partner will be
required to pay tax on his distributive share of such profit.
(c) The ability of the holders of such interests to amend the partnership agreement or
veto amendments to such partnership agreement.
(d) The existence or nonexistence of puts, options or buy-sell agreements (and the
terms of the agreements) in existence with respect to such interests as of the date of
receipt.
(e) Subordination of the profits interest to the rights of other partners to, for example,
a priority return on their investment and the right (if applicable) of one or more other
partners to terminate the partnership before the service partner is permitted to share in
earnings.
(f) The right of one or more other partners to receive guaranteed payments or other
forms of compensation that may minimize or eliminate profits in which no holder of
the profits interest would otherwise have shared.
Id. at 469-70.
225. See id. at 456; supra text accompanying notes 60-75.
226. I.R.C. §§ 707(a), (c) (1954). The content of Code section 707(a) (1954) now appears in
section 707(a)(1).
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cerning taxation of payments to a partner for services rendered to his
or her partnership.2 7 The report points to this essential no-change-of-
law analysis as the explanation for the absence of any direct discus-
sion of profits interest received for services in section 721' and the
accompanying regulations.' The report also espouses nonrealization
as the presumption where the aggregate concept of partnerships pre-
vails and a partner is compensated for services to the partnership. 20
Thus, particularly where the compensation is in the form of a profits
share, nonrecognition is unnecessary. The Section of Taxation rea-
soned that the addition of section 83231 to the Code in 1969232 did not
change this, since it does not deal with income realization, but instead
is concerned with the timing of income and its amount. 233
Despite the fact that the report includes substantial policy reasons
for not treating the receipt of a profits interest for services as a taxa-
ble event, including the consistency of such a position with long-
standing administrative practice and the elimination of needless com-
plexity, 34 the ABA report includes a recommendation that under cer-
tain circumstances a profits interest received for services be included
in the service provider's income 2" The ABA advocates income inclu-
sion consistent with the principles of sections 61 and 83236 where the
227. ABA Report, supra note 54, at 457.
228. l.R.C. § 721. Section 721 provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss when property is
contributed to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest. It has been argued that this
provision supports nonrecognition where a profits interest is received for services. See supra
parts II.B.2. and II.E.
229. ABA Report, supra note 54. at 457. Treasury Regulation section 1.721-1(b)(1) has been
the focus of much dispute and discussion concerning the taxability of profits interests received
for services, see supra text accompanying notes 76-79 and 181-84, since it was cited in support of
nonrecognition in a footnote in Hale v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1497, 1502 n.3 (1965).
See supra text accompanying notes 80-87.
230. See ABA Report, supra note 54, at 456. The aggregate concept of partnership taxation
views a partnership as "two or more persons who pool their capital or labor or both in order to
conduct jointly a business or other profit-making endeavor. Thereafter each partner is taxed on
his distributive share of income." Id. (citing United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973)).
231. I.R.C. § 83; see discussion supra parts II.D., II.E.3.
232. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
233. ABA Report, supra note 54, at 458-59. Thus, if income is not realized under Code
section 61, section 83 is not relevant.
234. ABA Report, supra note 54, at 460. The ABA also commented that any possibility for
abuse of the proposed general rule of nonrealization could be addressed through regulations that
would assist in the identification of situations where the service provider does not intend to be a
true partner and where a profits interest really is a disguised capital interest. Id. at 461-62.
235. Id. at 466.
236. I.R.C. §§ 61, 83. The time when a taxable profits interest becomes vested is governed by
Code section 83(a). Once included in income, the partner's outside basis in his partnership inter-
est equals the amount included in income. This approach requires that the partner's employer be
deemed to have received the profits interest tax free and then to have transferred it to the partner
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partnership interest is received for services provided to someone other
than the partnership. 2 7 While the determination of whether a taxable
event occurred would necessarily depend upon the facts and circum-
stances, 28 the majority of the drafters of the ABA report advocate
primarily relying on a primary contractual nexus test23 9 and a degree
of benefit test.2m Thus, the ABA report leaves the door open to the
needless complexity it disdains and injects another fine distinction that
must be made to determine the tax consequences when a partner re-
ceives a profits interest for services. Admittedly there is not the same
history of administrative practice supporting nonrealization in these
limited circumstances, and the ABA report does attempt to address
some of the complex issues triggered by includability. The benefit of
potential current inclusion, however, does not outweigh the substan-
tial administrative and practical burden of identifying taxable transac-
tions and dealing with their consequences.
F. Diamond Reconsidered: Campbell v. Commissioner
1. The Tax Court Applies Section 83
In Campbell v. Commissioner, "14 the United States Tax Court re-
cently considered, among other things, the validity of the Diamond
for his or her services. The employer would be entitled to a business expense deduction under
Code section 162(a) in the amount included in income by the partner, subject to the general rules
concerning capital expenditures. I.R.C. § 263; Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a)(4) (1978). Moreover, the
employer would recognize gain equal to the difference between the amount deducted as a busi-
ness expense or the amount capitalized and the employer's basis in the profits interest (which
would be zero since it was deemed to receive the interest tax free). ABA Report, supra note 54,
at 460-61.
237. ABA Report, supra note 54, at 454, 466. Essentially, this requires a determination of
whether or not the partner who got his or her interest for services, but is also an employee or
independent contractor of another partner or a third party, got his interest for services rendered
to the partnership. Id. at 454.
238. Id. at 466.
239. The primary contractual nexus test requires a determination of whether, in performing
services, the primary contractual nexus exists between the partner and the partnership, as op-
posed to another partner or a third party. All relevant contracts are to be considered, and with
respect to future services, the presumption is that the services are to be rendered for another
partner or a third party. This presumption can be rebutted by a direct contract with the partner-
ship for the services. Id.
240. The degree of benefit test looks at the extent to which the partnership benefits from the
partner's services. For the services to be viewed as rendered to the partnership, they must pro-
vide a significant benefit ta the partnership. Id. at 466-67. A minority of the committee who
worked on the ABA report would rely exclusively on the degree of benefit test to determine
whether the partner's services were rendered primarily to or for the benefit of the partnership.
Id. at 467.
241. 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
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doctrine and the application of section 83 to a partnership profits in-
terest received in exchange for services. In the court's memorandum
decision, not only did Judge Scott hold that section 83 applied to the
profits interest,2 42 but she also accepted a novel approach to valuing
the interest for the purpose of determining the amount that must be
included in the taxpayers' income.4 3
The findings of fact in Campbell were fairly extensive. This is pri-
marily because Campbell acquired three profits interests in the context
of real estate syndications. The terms of the partnership agreements in
these settings typically are very elaborate and set forth in great detail
by the court. The following discussion will summarize the essential
facts that led to the court's ultimate conclusions.
During 1979 and 1980, Campbell was an employee of Summa T.
Group, an organization "primarily engaged in the formation and syn-
dication of limited partnerships." 2" Early in 1979, Campbell's respon-
sibilities changed from sales to locating and arranging the acquisition
of properties suitable for syndication, assisting in the preparation of
offering materials and promoting sales of partnership interests. 2 5
In connection with Campbell's new job responsibilities, he entered
into a new compensation arrangement. Campbell was entitled to fif-
teen percent of the proceeds of the sale of each syndication, in addi-
tion to a "'special limited partnership interest' in each limited
partnership that he helped form and finance. 24 It was the receipt of
three of these special limited partnership interests that triggered the
tax controversy before the Tax Court.
As a special limited partner, Campbell was entitled to a share of the
limited partnerships' profits and losses. After payment of a priority
return to the bulk of the investors, Class A limited partners, as a spe-
cial limited partner, Campbell was entitled to a special priority return
out of available cash. In addition, if more cash was available after
payment of the priority returns and a fixed payment to the general
partner, cash would be distributed in accordance with Campbell's
share of profits and losses. Campbell also had a right to a share of the
proceeds of a sale or refinancing of partnership property.147
The projections prepared for each limited partnership offering indi-
cated that there would be quite a few years where the partnerships
242. Campbell, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) at 253.
243. See id. at 253-56. For the tax years in question, the Campbells filed joint returns.
244. Id. at 237.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 238-46 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 815
(8th Cir. 1991).
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would pass through only losses, deductions and credits. In addition, it
would take quite a few years for the partnerships to have cash availa-
ble for distributionY2 Finally, each offering memorandum cautioned
investors that "the partnership's positions with respect to certain de-
ductions and credits were not based on settled interpretations of the
tax laws and that the Internal Revenue Service might disallow any of
the various deductions and credits claimed."2 9
As projected, during 1979 and 1980, the partnerships passed
through substantial losses, deductions, and credits. Campbell's re-
turns reflected his shares of these amounts. 25 0 In addition, based upon
the advice of reputable tax counsel,25 ' Campbell did not report any
income representing the value of the partnership interests in the year
of receipt. Ultimately, the Commissioner not only asserted that these
values should have been reflected as income, but also disallowed sub-
stantial amounts of the partnership losses, deductions, and credits .
2
Prior to trial, the parties stipulated to the allowable losses, deduc-
tions, and credits. This left two substantial issues for the Tax Court:
(1) "whether petitioners were required to include in income the value
of the partnership interests," and (2) "if so, the value of such inter-
ests." 253
The Tax Court began its analysis of these issues by considering
whether the nonrecognition rule of section 721(a)214 applied in this
case to defer inclusion in income of the value of Campbell's partner-
ship interests. The taxpayers had asked the court to reconsider the ap-
plicability of Treasury Regulation section 1.721-1(b)(1) 251 to the
receipt of a partnership profits interest. The court, however, declined
to do so, citing its rejection of the same argument in Diamond v.
Commissioner2- and reaffirming the Diamond holding. 2"1 The court
did not believe that section 721(a)'s nonrecognition rule was intended
to cover any situation where a partnership interest is received for serv-
ices rather than property.2 5 1
248. See id.
249. Id. at 242.
250. Id. at 246-47.
251. Id. at 237-38.
252. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 247 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 815 (8th
Cir. 1991).
253. Id.
254. I.R.C. § 721(a) (1992); see supra part II.B.2.
255. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1), 25 Fed. Reg. 11814 (1960).
256. 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
257. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 249 (1990).
258. Id. The partnerships' records and returns indicated that Campbell had received his in-
terest for services previously rendered by him. Id.
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Having concluded that there existed no nonrecognition provision
that prevented the inclusion in income of the value of Campbell's in-
terest, the court went on to hold that section 83 controlled the timing
of the inclusion. 2 9 First, the court noted, the limited partnership inter-
ests were property within the meaning of section 83. Despite the Com-
missioner's arguments, the court rejected the idea that even a pure
profits interest is akin to the "unfunded and unsecured promise to
pay money or property in the future" excluded from the definition of
property by Treasury Regulation section 1.83-3(e).160 Relying on the
Uniform Limited Partnership Acts' characterization of a limited part-
nership interest as personal propertyml and the absence of a distinc-
tion between profits and capital interests, 262 the Tax Court held that
Campbell received property within the meaning of section 83.263
The court then considered the taxpayers' argument that the partner-
ship interests in two situations were not transferred in connection with
the receipt of services. With respect to two of the limited partnerships,
an original shell limited partnership was formed prior to the syndica-
tion and sale of the limited partnership interests to the ultimate inves-
tors. In those partnerships, Campbell acquired a limited partnership
interest in exchange for a nominal cash contribution. 26 Once each
syndication was complete, however, Campbell was demoted to special
limited partner status.
The Tax Court, rejecting the taxpayers' argument, characterized
Campbell's receipt of the special limited partnership interests as trans-
fers separate and distinct from his acquisition of the original limited
partnership interests for cash. The court viewed the original limited
partnerships as being created merely to facilitate the syndications.
Campbell's original limited partnership interests were "quantitatively
and qualitatively"2"5 different from his special limited partnership in-
terests. The court stated that Campbell acquired the latter interests
solely as a product of the prior services he rendered to his employer
under his compensation package. 26 Moreover, the court found no ap-
parent justification to distinguish the tax consequences in the two set-
259. Id. at 250.
260. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985).
261. UNin. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 701,6 U.L.A. 439 (Supp. 1993).
262. Id. at §§ 101(10), 701.
263. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 250 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 815 (8th
Cir. 1991).
264. Id. at 238, 241.
265. Id. at 251.
266. Id. at 252.
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tings where a shell was used to facilitate the syndication from the one
situation where there was no shell. 67
Finally, with respect to section 83's application, the Tax Court con-
sidered whether Campbell's interests were subject to a substantial risk
of forfeiture.2 68 Since the interests were not freely transferable, a sub-
stantial risk of forfeiture would postpone income inclusion until the
transfer restriction or forfeiture risk lapsed. 26 9 In arguing that there
was a substantial risk of forfeiture, the taxpayers relied upon section
83(c)(1). Section 83(c)(1) provides: "The rights of a person in property
are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if such person's rights to
full enjoyment of such property are conditioned upon the future per-
formance of substantial services by any individual. "270 They also re-
lied upon Treasury Regulation section 1.83-3(c)(2), which provides in
part that "[w]here an employee receives property from an employer
subject to a requirement that it be returned if the total earnings of the
employer do not increase, such property is subject to a substantial risk
of forfeiture. 27
1
The taxpayers' entire argument focused on the speculative nature of
Campbell's interest. Campbell would not receive any cash distribu-
tions unless the partnerships were successful enough to pay more than
the Class A limited's preferential return. Moreover, Campbell would
not get any proceeds from a sale or refinancing unless a partnership's
primary asset substantially appreciated. Admittedly, economic success
of each partnership depended to some degree on substantial services
to be performed by someone. 2 2 All of that, however, goes to the val-
ues of the interests. Nowhere did the court find a requirement, once
the partnerships reached minimum subscription levels, that Camp-
bell's interest be returned if the partnerships did not prosper. 273
Having thus determined that section 83 required inclusion in income
of the value of Campbell's partnership interests, the court went on to
determine their fair market value. The Commissioner's position at
267. Id. at 251-52.
268. See I.R.C. §§ 83(a)(1), (c)(l)-(2) (1992); supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
269. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 252 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 815 (8th
Cir. 1991).
270., I.R.C. § 83(c)(1); see Campbell, 59 T.C.M. at 252.
271. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(2) (as amended in 1985); see Campbell, 59 T.C.M. at 252-53.
The court interpreted Treasury Regulation section 1.83-3(c)(2) as requiring that there be an
agreement "to actually recover possession of the property rights transferred ... when increased
earnings do not materialize." Campbell, 59 T.C.M. at 253.
272. See Campbell, 59 T.C.M. at 253.
273. Id. Campbell's interests never returned any economic benefit, all three partnerships
having wound up in Bankruptcy Court within two years of their formation. Paravano, supra
note 200, at 540.
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trial regarding value was based on the present value of the projected
tax benefits and cash distributions set forth in the offering memoran-
dum for each of the partnerships. 274 The taxpayers first argued that
the value of the interests was so speculative that the interests were not
capable of valuation. Alternatively, the taxpayers had an expert testify
that the value of the interests was far less than the Commissioner as-
serted. This expert's valuation also discounted to present value the
projected cash distributions (although using a different discount rate
than the Commissioner), but assigned no value to the projected tax
benefits, based on the representation in the offering memoranda that
there was a substantial risk these would be eliminated if there was an
audit. In addition, the taxpayers' expert took into account transfer
restrictions and lack of participation in management.
275
Overall, the court rejected the position taken by the taxpayers' ex-
pert as "not based on sound reasoning. " 276 The primary reason for
this conclusion was that very similar interests, Class A limited partner-
ship interests, were sold for a substantial amount at or around the
time Campbell got his interests. Thus, the court did not accept the
allegation that the values were de minimus or that the projected tax
benefits had no value 277 Finally, the court refused to consider a laps-
ing transfer restriction in calculating value.2 78
On the other hand, the court also rejected the value determined by
the Commissioner. The court concluded that the Commissioner's
value was too high because he used a discount rate that was too low.
The court found that the rate was too low because the Commissioner
projected sales of the partnerships' principal assets before they proba-
bly would occur. 279
274. The Commissioner did not have an expert testify as to fair market value. Campbell, 59
T.C.M. at 253.
275. Id. at 254.
276. Id. at 255. The taxpayers' expert had determined that each partnership interest was
worth $1,000. The court described the expert's conclusion that each interest had exactly the same
nominal value as "unreasonable, without basis, and quite obviously plucked out of thin air."* Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 254; see I.R.C. § 83(a); supra note 160 and accompanying text.
279. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCK) 236, 255-56 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 815
(8th Cir. 1991). The Commissioner calculated value assuming, among other things, that there
would be a liquidation of the partnerships in 1989. Id. at 255. It concluded that such a liquida-
tion would result in the Class A limited partners getting nothing. Id. The court believed that it
was unlikely the partnerships would liquidate in 1989, since it was likely that soon thereafter
there would be sufficient proceeds upon liquidation to repay at least part of the Class A limiteds'
capital. Id. Moreover, even a 1989 liquidation would result in some return to these limited part-
ners. Id. The general partners and the special limited partners, on the other hand, had "little
realistic chance" of recovering capital or receiving a distribution in the foreseeable future. Id.
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Ultimately, for two of Campbell's three partnership interests the
court applied the discount rate used by Campbell's expert'80 to the
projected value of the tax benefits associated with these interests. The
court discounted further the value of the third interest to reflect that
Campbell acquired it before the primary financing for the partner-
ship's proposed project was in place."8 ' Finally, the court declined to
determine whether Campbell was negligent in failing to include any
amount in income in the year of receipt of the partnership interests. 22
The Tax Court's decision in Campbell resolved, at least as far as the
Tax Court was concerned,23 whether section 83 applies to the receipt
of a profits interest for services rendered. Unfortunately, the decision
left unanswered many more questions than it answered regarding the
consequences of section 83's application in this context. The following
are examples of unresolved issues: How are problems of double taxa-
tion and double tax benefit to be resolved? If the profits interest is not
vested, what is the tax effect of the service provider not being the
owner of the interest until it vests? When does a lapse occur?2' More-
over, Campbell involved a situation where the court found that the
service provider received his interest for services previously rendered
for his employer. Whether section 83 applies where the services are to
be rendered in the future in his or her capacity as a partner was left
open to speculation. If section 83 does not apply, additional questions
arise where some of the services are to be provided in the future as a
partner, but some have already been provided as an employee or inde-
pendent contractor.
Once the Campbell court upheld Diamond and concluded that sec-
tion 83 applied to the receipt of a profits interest for services, it was
not a startling conclusion that the interests were vested and, therefore,
280. The taxpayers' expert calculated the discount rate "by multiplying the 1979 Baa Corpo-
rate Bond Rate of 12.22 percent and the 1980 Baa Corporate Bond Rate of 15.19 percent by a
factor of 2.5." Id. at 254.
281. Id. at 256.
282. Id. at 258. After holding that the taxpayers were negligent in claiming excessive deduc-
tions and credits, the court concluded that it did not have to discuss whether the taxpayers were
also negligent in failing to include any amount in income. Id. It should be noted, however, that
Campbell consulted two tax attorneys, one of whom taught partnership tax law at New York
University. Id. at 237. The attorneys advised Campbell that there was little or no chance he
would be taxed on the receipt of the partnership interests and that the facts of Diamond were
distinguishable. Id. at 237-38.
283. The Committee on Partnerships of the American Bar Association's Section of Taxation
is planning to issue a notice and report concerning the Campbell decision. Bob Casey, Commit-
tee Highlights: Panel on the Campbell Case Dealing With Receipt of a Partnership Interest for
Services-Committee on Partnership, 10 Sac. TAX'N NEwSL. 21, 23 (1990).
284. See supra part II.E.3.
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their value had to be included in income upon receipt.2 5 It was the
valuation method used by the Tax Court that was extraordinary. This
was the first case involving a profits interest where the present value
of projected tax benefits determined value. 286 Since there were contem-
poraneous sales of similar partnership interests and little or no pros-
pect of profits or cash distributions for any partner for quite some
time, it was not unreasonable that the court found some value in
Campbell's interests and used the projected tax benefits to determine
that value. The court erred, however, in refusing to take into account
the substantial risk that the projected tax benefits would be disallowed
and the fact that Campbell's return was subordinated to other inves-
tors' return.
In deciding whether the negligence penalty should apply, the court
explained that Campbell was not an outsider who merely reviewed the
offering memorandum with its warning concerning the risk of loss of
the tax benefits.2 7 He was intimately familiar with the way the organ-
izers of the limited partnerships developed overstated values for part-
nership assets and characterized certain nondeductible payments as
deductible fees. 28 This, in turn, caused the projected tax benefits to be
severely overstated .289
The amount included in income under section 83 is equal to the fair
market value of the asset received for services. 290 Fair market value is
to be determined on the assumption that a willing buyer and willing
285. See supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
286. Earlier decisions dealing with receipt of a profits interest for services, see St. John v.
United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9158 (C.D. Iil. 1983); National Oil Co. v. Commissioner,
52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1223 (1986); IZenroy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1749 (1984),
and the IRS's express position in Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 23, 1975 and July 25, 1977),
support the use of liquidation value for determining the value of a service partner's interest. A
pure profits interest would never entitle the owner to anything upon a liquidation. Thus, the
interest would be valueless. Another possible valuation method uses the inherent risk approach.
Under this approach, a pure profits interest would be accorded no value because of its inherently
risky nature. See Paravano, supra note 200, at 554.
287. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 257 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 815 (8th
Cir. 1991).
288. Id. at 257-58.
289. The court refers to the partnerships in which Campbell held interests as Phillips House,
the Grand and Airport. In 1979, Campbell's Phillips House K-I allocated to him a $102 ordinary
loss and a $24,000 charitable contribution. For 1980, his Phillips House loss was $36,374. Id. at
241. As to Phillips House, the parties stipulated to a $6000 charitable contribution and no allow-
able losses. Id. at 247. The 1980 K-I for the Grand allocated to Campbell an $8115 ordinary loss
and a $55 separately accounted-for item. Id. at 244. The parties stipulated to a 84247.94 loss
from the Grand. Id. at 247. Campbell's share of the 1980 loss from Airport was $6024. Id. at
246. The parties stipulated to a $1304.55 Airport loss. Id. at 247.
290. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1) (1992).
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seller have "reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.' '291 When de-
scribing the structuring of the three syndications, the court referred to
abuses and sham transactions employed to inflate the tax benefits de-
scribed in the offering memoranda.2 92 The Class A limited partners
were not aware of facts relating to these abuses and shams when they
purchased their interests. If they had been, they would have been un-
willing to pay the offering price for their partnership interests. The
undisclosed facts undoubtedly were "relevant" to an assessment of
the Class A limited partnership interests' value. The Class A limited
partners did not have reasonable knowledge of these relevant facts.
Therefore, any reference to the amount paid by the Class A limited
partners as demonstrating that Campbell's interest had fair market
value is misplaced. The Class A limiteds did not pay fair market
value.
The facts relating to the structuring of the partnerships to maximize
projected tax benefits, resulting in substantial risk of loss of many of
these benefits, were relevant. This structuring technique was not un-
common or unfamiliar in the 1970's tax shelter limited partnership
market, with its ample supply of shams and abuses. While the court
had the opportunity to take the relevant facts into account to deter-
mine the fair market value of Campbell's special limited partnership
interests, it did not do so. After failing to consider the subordinated
nature of Campbell's interests, the Tax Court in Campbell took an
approach that clearly overstated the fair market value of Campbell's
interests.
2. The Eighth Circuit Finds No Value
With the Eighth Circuit's reversal in Campbell 29 we return essen-
tially to the uncertainty that existed prior to the Tax Court's decision.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit refused to
accept the Commissioner's concession that the Tax Court erred to the
extent it held that the receipt of a profits interest for services to a
partnership constitutes ordinary income.29 It also declined to consider
the Commissioner's alternative argument that the interests were re-
ceived in exchange for services provided to Campbell's employer, 29
291. Estate of Guilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 48 (1987); see Hamm v. Commis-
sioner, 325 F.2d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); Treas. Reg. §
l. 170A-l(c)(2) (as amended in 1975).
292. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 256-58 (1990).
293. Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
294. Id. at 818, 821.
295. Id. at 818.
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despite the fact that the Tax Court clearly stated that this was how
Campbell got his interests. 2 6 Instead, the Eighth Circuit focused on
the Tax Court's reaffirmation of Diamond 97 and its accompanying
reference to the instant case involving the receipt of a partnership in-
terest in exchange for services rendered to the partnerships. 298
After rejecting the Commissioner's factual concession concerning
the nature of the services rendered, the Eighth Circuit went on to re-
ject the substantive concession concerning the applicability of section
721.199 The court held that the receipts of the profits interests were not
eligible for nonrecognition under section 721. 30 The Eighth Circuit
considered the taxpayers' argument that Treasury Regulation section
1.721-1(b)(1) 301 evidences an intent to distinguish capital interests from
profits interests and acknowledged that there is some justification for
the distinction when dealing with the section 721 nonrecognition
rules,302 but the court was unwilling to go so far as to allow nonrecog-
nition here.
Instead, reminiscent of the ABA proposal and report discussed su-
pra303 the court concluded that the principles controlling the taxation
of payments to a partner for services or the use of property set forth
in section 707 of the Code were more dispositive of the issue here.3°0
Under section 707(a), the characterization of payments for services to
a partner depend on whether the partner is acting in his or her capac-
ity as a partner. 05 The court described the purpose of this section as
assuring that a payment to a partner acting in a nonpartner capacity
will not be treated as a distributive share of income.31 Thus, the rules
requiring capitalization of certain compensatory payments cannot be
avoided. The Eighth Circuit concluded that "[a]rguably, section
707(a) would be unnecessary if compensatory transfers of profits in-
296. See Campbell, 59 T.C.M. at 237-38, 251-52.
297. See id. at 249. The Eighth Circuit quoted the following language from the Tax Court's
opinion: .'that section 721(a) and the regulations thereunder are simply inapplicable where, as
in the Diamond case and the instant case, a partner receives his partnership interest in exchange
for services he has rendered to the partnership.' Campbell, 59 T.C.M. at 249." 943 F.2d at 818
(emphasis added).
298. Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 1991).
299. Id. at 819.
300. Id. at 821.
301. See supra note 54-55.
302. 943 F.2d at 822.
303. See supra notes 203-40 and accompanying text.
304. Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 822 (8th Cir. 1991).
305. See I.R.C. § 707(a) (1992).
306. 943 F.2d at 822.
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terests were taxable upon receipt, because if so, every such transfer
would be taxed without this section."
3307
Overall, the section 707(a) analysis suggests that a partner acting in
a partner capacity would not realize income upon receipt of a profits
interest, but if acting in a nonpartner capacity, there would be a taxa-
ble event. At this point, however, the Eighth Circuit failed to apply its
section 707 analysis to Campbell's receipts and instead considered the
valuation issue.10 8 Before reviewing the Tax Court's decision, it distin-
guished the Diamond case from Campbell because Diamond's "prof-
its interest was properly taxable as easily calculable compensation for
services performed.''3 9 The court reversed the Tax Court and found
that Campbell's profits interest had only "speculative, if any,
value."3 o10 Reliance on the value attached to the Class A limited part-
nership interests was misplaced, such interests being substantially dif-
ferent from those received by Campbell.3 ' The predictions as to the
ultimate success of the partnership ventures and the projected tax ben-
efits also were inappropriate bases for the calculation of fair market
value, as these too were speculative.
12
Thus, the Eighth Circuit, like some of its predecessors," ' opted out
of reaching any definitive conclusions about the taxation of profits
interests received for services, relying instead upon the conclusion that
the interests received by Campbell had no determinable fair market
value. While the court cited Diamond1 4 with approval and seemed to
reject section 721's application to the receipt of a profits interest for
services,"' it conceded that there is some basis for distinguishing the
tax treatment of the receipt of a capital interest from the receipt of a
profits interest. 1 6 The Eighth Circuit did not address the issue of sec-
tion 83's role here, but turned instead to a section 707(a) analysis,
which it ultimately did not apply to Campbell's case.317 Arguably, the
court's conclusion that Campbell received his interests from the part-
307. Id.
308. Id. at 822-23.
309. Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 822 (8th Cir. 1991).
310. Id. at 823.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See St. John v. United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9158 (C.D. II1. 1983); Finkleman
v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1269 (1989), aff'd, 937 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. de-
nied, 112 S.Ct. 1291 (1992); Kenroy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1749 (1984); see
supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
314. See Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974); discussion supra parts
II.C.I., 1I.C.2.
315. See Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1991).
316. Id. at 822.
317. Id.
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nerships, not his employer, 18 rendered section 83 inapplicable to
Campbell's receipt.31 9 Finally, while the Eighth Circuit did not reject
the valuation method that uses discounted benefits to calculate value,
it gave so much weight to the risk that the partnerships would not be
successful that it found no determinable value.320 If this approach is
followed by other courts in the future, it is almost certain to eliminate
value in any profits interest in a start-up venture. Even the presence of
sales of interests with essentially similar risks would not outweigh the
speculative nature of the projected benefits to allow valuation of most
profits interests. 32' Thus, after the Campbell decision, we seem to be
no further along in developing a clear body of law concerning the tax
treatment of the receipt of a profits interest for services than we were
before.
G. The IRS Takes A Stand: Revenue Procedure 93-27"s
Safe (?) Harbor
On July 6, 1993, the Treasury Department released Revenue Proce-
dure 93-27322 and at long last took a position in a published ruling on
the tax consequences of the receipt of a partnership profits interest for
services. Essentially, the ruling purports to offer taxpayers a safe har-
bor where the IRS will not treat the receipt of a profits interest for
services as a taxable event.32 This safe harbor, however, is not only
subject to certain express exceptions, 24 but also the scope of its appli-
cation is unclear even when these exceptions clearly do not apply.
The ruling begins by offering definitions of a "capital interest" and
a "profits interest." 325 A capital interest is defined as "an interest that
would give the holder a share of the proceeds if the partnership's as-
sets were sold at fair market value and then the proceeds were distrib-
uted in a complete liquidation of the partnership. This determination
318. Id. at 818, 821.
319. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(f) (as amended in 1985). Alternatively, the Eighth Circuit's
decision could be read as silently affirming the Tax Court's decision as to section 83's applica-
tion since it does not appear that Campbell alleged error in this respect. See Campbell, 943 F.2d
at 823.
320. Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 822-23 (8th Cir. 1991); see supra notes 286
and accompanying text.
321. See Note, Conrad J. Jacoby, Partnership Profits Interests-Valuation and Taxability:
The Aftermath of Campbell v. Commissioner, 45 TAx LAW. 513, 524-25 (1992).
322. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-24 I.R.B. 63.
323. Id. at 64.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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generally is made at the time of receipt of the partnership interest. 'a26
A profits interest is defined as "a partnership interest other than a
capital interest.1 32 7 These definitions are consistent with those used by
courts3 2 and commentators32 9 and generally work well to distinguish
one type of partnership interest from the other.
After providing some regulatory 330 and common law331 background
on the tax consequences of receipt of a profits interest for services,
332
Revenue Procedure 93-27 goes on to provide that the IRS will not
treat the receipt of such an interest as a taxable event for the service
partner or the partnership "if a person receives a profits interest for
the provision of services to or for the benefit of a partnership in a
partner capacity or in anticipation of being a partner . . . -333 Within
this last statement lies the not-so-safe harbor of Revenue Procedure
93-27.
First, the protection of the safe harbor is available only if the serv-
ices in question were provided "to or for the benefit of a partner-
ship. 334 While this requirement may sound and frequently will be
simple to satisfy, we have already learned from the Campbell deci-
sions that where a taxpayer has multiple relationships with the partici-
pants to a transaction involving a partnership, as Campbell did,
33 it
326. Id. The IRS offers no explanation as to the circumstances in which the determination of
whether an interest is capital would not be made at the time of receipt. Perhaps a later time is
appropriate where a temporary partnership structure is adopted, only to be reorganized as soon
as all of the partners are identified and contributions are made. See, e.g., Campbell v. Commis-
sioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 251-52 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991); see supra notes
265-67 and accompanying text.
327. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-24 I.R.B. 63, 64.
328. See, e.g., St. John v. United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9158 (C.D. Ill. 1983); see
supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
329. See, e.g., McKEE EY AL., supra note 54, 5.05[1]; see supra notes 54-55 and accompa-
nying text.
330. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960).
331. St. John, 84-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) at 9158; Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M.
(CCH) 236 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991); Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 530
(1971), aff'd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
332. The IRS begins by acknowledging that the significance of Treasury Regulation section
1.721-1(b)(1) has been the subject of dispute when a profits interest is received in exchange for
services. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-24 I.R.B. 63, 64. The IRS goes on to describe the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision in Campbell as suggesting in dictum that such a transaction is not taxable, but
that the District Court in St. John and the Tax Court in Campbell held that it is taxable under
section 83. Id. The IRS corcludes, however, that typically even where courts treat the receipt of
the profits interest as a taxable event and where there was a quick sale, with the exception of the
result in Diamond, the interests have been found to have no value. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
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may be far from certain for whom the services are being rendered.336
Moreover, the ruling is unclear as to whether this requirement for its
safe harbor can be satisfied where services are rendered before a part-
nership exists.
Second, the safe harbor also requires that the services be rendered
"in a partner capacity or in anticipation of being a partner. 33 7 The
potential difficulty of determining whether a partner's services are
rendered in his or her partner capacity has been discussed above.33 As
for the alternative requirement that the services be rendered "in antic-
ipation of being a partner,"33 9 there still is ample room for doubt. The
application of this requirement is necessarily limited to situations
where the partnership interest is transferred in exchange for past serv-
ices. It is during the period of providing services that the "anticipa-
tion" of the service provider must be determined. There is no
discussion in the ruling as to how this "anticipation" is to be estab-
lished. Is the analysis objective or subjective? Should the approach be
like that used to determine partnership intent, examining various ob-
jective factors to reach a conclusion regardless of the representations
of the parties to the transaction? Finally, can one render services in
anticipation of becoming a partner when the partnership interest re-
ceived is a constructive one, as is the case with recharacterized service
contracts? With all of these unanswered questions, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to conclude with certainty that the IRS will not assert
taxability where services are provided before the service provider be-
comes a profits partner.
After stating its general rule, Revenue Procedure 93-27 lists an in-
teresting series of exceptions. a40 The general rule of the revenue proce-
dure does not apply:
(1) If the profits interest relates to a substantially certain and
predictable stream of income from partnership assets ... ;
(2) If within two years of receipt, the partner disposes of the profits
interest; or
(3) If the profits interest is a limited partnership interest in a
"publicly traded partnership" within the meaning of section 7704(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code. 1'
336. See Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 1991); Campbell v. Com-
missioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 237-38, 249, 251-52 (1990); see supra notes 295-96 and accom-
panying text.
337. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-24 I.R.B. 63, 64.
338. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
339. 1993-24 I.R.B. at 64.
340. See id.
341. Id.
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Individually, each of these exceptions presents its own potential chal-
lenges. With respect to the first exception, the "substantially certain
and predictable" standard leaves room for interpretation and thus for
uncertainty. While the revenue procedure mentions two situations
covered by this exception,3 42 these are merely examples and are not the
only situations to which this exception may apply. The second excep-
tion seems certain enough, but may eliminate an opportunity for plan-
ning for taxability since its application is retroactive and may be
unforeseen. Finally, the third exception imports issues concerning the
interpretation of the term "publicly traded partnership' ' 41 to this al-
ready uncertain area of federal income taxation.
When looked at as a group, the exceptions to the general rule that
the IRS will not assert that there was a taxable event when a profits
interest is received for services reveal the IRS's true perspective on
these transactions. Each of the exceptions attempts to identify profits
interests received for services that are relatively easy to value. 3 " Essen-
tially, the IRS has agreed not to assert taxability where it probably
will be unable to sustain a reasonable value for the profits interest.
Thus, the revenue procedure does not suggest a concession on the is-
sue of taxability. Instead, Revenue Procedure 93-27 evidences the
IRS's view that it is best to concede cases where it may be able to
succeed on the merits, but will likely lose on the valuation issue. Be-
yond these circumstances, Revenue Procedure 93-27 leaves the IRS
with sufficient room for interpretation to allow the IRS in many cases
342. The two situations mentioned in Revenue Procedure 93-27 where an income stream is
certain and predictable are where the income is "from high-quality debt securities or a high-
quality net lease." Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-24 I.R.B. 63, 64.
343. Code section 7704(b) (1992) defines "publicly traded partnership" as any partnership if
"(1) interests in such partnership are traded on an established securities market, or; (2) interests
in such partnership are readily tradable on a secondary market (or the substantial equivalent
thereof)."
For a discussion of issues relating to this classification, see, for example, John W. Lee, Pub-
licly Traded Partnerships, Personal Service Corporations, and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 VA.
TAX IEv. 57 (1988); Edward D. Biggers, Publicly Traded Partnerships Deemed Corporations for
Federal Taxation Purposes: New Internal Revenue Code Section 7704, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1158
(1988).
344. The first exception, based on presence of a certain income stream, addresses the con-
cerns expressed in cases where profits interests were found to lack a determinable value because
future income was speculative. See Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 822-23 (8th Cir.
1991); St. John v. United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9158 (C.D. Ill. 1983). The second
exception mimics the facts of Diamond that indicated the taxpayer's interest had value, although
the sale in Diamond occurred 13 months after the interest's receipt, while the ruling exception
covers sales up to two years later. See Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286, 287 (7th Cir.
1974). The third exception for publicly traded partnership profits interests seems to correct the
valuation obstacle the Eighth Circuit found in Campbell, the absence of sales of interests that
were sufficiently similar to the profits interest in question. See Campbell, 943 F.2d at 818, 821.
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to continue to press for inclusion in income of the value of a profits
interest received for services. At the same time, the IRS continues its
silence regarding the various tax consequences of such inclusion to
partners and partnerships.
III. TAX PLAN NG
Even with Revenue Procedure 93-27141 and Campbell,34 the proper
tax treatment of the exchange of services for a constructive profits
interest is uncertain. Thus, tax planning for a service contract is very
difficult, because the risks associated with potential partnership char-
acterization are impossible to quantify.3 47 From the service provider's
standpoint, in the best case, the form of the transaction will be re-
spected and the service provider will report as ordinary income his or
her share of profits when it is received.3 4 The proprietor, in contrast,
may be content with the respected form if, under the rules governing
capitalization, 9 the proprietor can currently deduct the contingent
compensation. 50
Even if the service contract is recharacterized, there are substantial
arguments supporting no immediate income inclusion, as well as sev-
eral precautions that can be taken to minimize or eliminate adverse
tax consequences. The nature of a service contract is such that it will
almost always involve receipt of the service provider's interest for sub-
stantial future services. To the extent that Diamon3 5' and CampbelP12
reach definitive conclusions about any of the issues associated with
the receipt of a profits interest for services, they did so in the case of
345. 1993-24 I.R.B. 63.
346. 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
347. Leading partnership tax practitioners continue to advise clients that "there is 'little or
no chance' that you will be subject to federal income tax." Roundtable Discussion on Partner-
ship Taxation with William S. McKee, Blake D. Rubin, and R. Donald Turlington, 12 ABA SEc.
TAx'N NEWsL. 47, 47 (Spring 1993) [hereinafter Roundtable].
348. This assumes that the service provider is an individual and, therefore, uses the cash
method of accounting. This also assumes that the contingent compensation is a share of profits,
rather than gross receipts. The risk of recharacterization is virtually eliminated when gross re-
ceipts provide the measuring rod. See, e.g., Robinson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 20 (1965).
349. See I.R.C. § 263 (1992); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-l(a)-(b) (as amended in 1965).
350. The adverse tax consequences of recharacterization likely will fall exclusively on the
service provider. In fact, if taxed as a partnership, the income splitting associated with such a
relationship may yield a better result for the proprietor than when the form is respected and the
compensation payments must be capitalized. Recharacterization, though, probably is not an al-
ternative the proprietor should rely on, since taxpayers generally cannot use the argument of
substance over form. See supra notes 34-48 and accompanying text.
351. Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974); see supra notes 88-119 and
accompanying text.
352. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir.
1991); see supra notes 241-321.
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past services provided in exchange for a profits interest. Although
commentators have questioned the wisdom of the timing of service
rendering as a basis for determining taxability, such a distinction may
be judicially attractive. This is particularly so in light of the Eighth
Circuit's clear expression in Campbell of some doubt about the appro-
priateness of applying the same rule of law to both the receipt of a
profits interest and to the receipt of a capital interest. 3"3 It did, how-
ever, affirm Diamond and hold that section 721 does not provide a
basis for nonrecognition where a partnership interest is received for
services . 5 4 Moreover, the receipt of a constructive profits interest for
future services does not appear to satisfy the "in anticipation of being
a partner" requirement of Revenue Procedure 93-27's safe harbor."5
Therefore, the two circuit court decisions and a revenue procedure
provide tenuous precedents for determining whether it is worth the
risk of recharacterization to adopt an aggressive service contract struc-
ture, and whether protective provisions restricting the service provi-
der's interest are advisable to guard against possible current inclusion
of the value of the service provider's interest under section 83.356
Moreover, the IRS has announced that it has changed its litigation
posture in cases like Campbell.357 The focus in the future will be akin
to the position it attempted to assert on appeal in Campbell, distin-
guishing cases dependent upon whether the taxpayer was acting in his
or her capacity as an employee rather than as a partner. 5 This is rem-
iniscent of the section 707 standard, which the Eighth Circuit in
Campbell referred to as "[p]robably more relevant""3 9 to their analy-
sis of the issue at hand, and which the ABA Proposal advocated as an
appropriate criterion for determining the tax consequences of the re-
ceipt of a profits interest for services. a60 Under this standard, it is un-
likely that the profits interest received by the service provider involved
in a recharacterized service contract will escape income inclusion un-
less some protective measures are taken.3 61
The cautious planner should assume that Diamond and section 83
will apply when a service contract is characterized as a partnership for
353. See Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d at 822; see supra notes 301-02 and accompa-
nying text.
354. See Campbell, 943 F.2d at 821; supra note 300 and accompanying text.
355. See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-24 I.R.B. 63, 64; supra notes 337-39 and accompanying text.
356. See I.R.C. § 83 (1992); discussion supra part I.D.
357. Jacoby, supra note 321, at 518.
358. See supra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
359. Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 822 (8th Cir. 1991).
360. See supra notes 203-20 and accompanying text.
361. Roundtable, supra note 347, at 47.
11771994]
1178 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:1125
tax purposes. Thus, the value, if any, of the profits interest will be
included in the service provider's income when received unless the in-
terest is not vested.3 62 If the profits interest is subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture and nontransferable, taxation may be deferred until
either restriction lapses.3 63 Inclusion at a later date, however, when the
interest may have significant value, also has potential adverse tax con-
sequences. 3" It is best, therefore, to structure the service provider's
interest so that it is of little or no value when received, regardless of
whether or not it is vested. Even the value of an interest that is not
vested can be included in income upon receipt if the service provider
makes a protective section 83(b) election.3 65
Unfortunately, additional uncertainty abounds as to how the profits
interest will be valued should that become necessary. If the liquidation
method is used, as it has been in the majority of cases, 3" then as long
as the profits interest is pure and the service provider's interest is not
contemporaneously sold or assigned,3 67 the profits interest will be val-
ueless without taking any precautionary steps. Since the contract in-
volves rendering substantial services, as a business matter it probably
would be desirable to have some prohibition or restriction on transfer
anyway. If the inherent risk approach to valuation is used,3" then ab-
sent a contemporaneous sale or assignment, a low or no value deter-
mination would depend upon the extent to which the venture is
perceived as speculative. 369 This approach seems akin to the concept of
risk of forfeiture set forth in section 83,370 and thus value could be
defeated by including a forfeiture clause. Once again, considering that
the contract is premised on the service provider providing future serv-
362. See I.R.C. § 83(a)(1) (1992); supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
364. Not only is the owner of an interest that is not vested deemed not to be the owner, but
also the value of the interest when it vests is included in ordinary income. Thus, appreciation is
converted from capital gain into ordinary income. Compare Treasury Regulation sections 1.83-
l(a)(l), (b) (1978) (treating income upon vesting or prior sale as compensation income) with
Code section 741 (1992) (generally treating gain on sale or exchange of partnership interest as
from sale of capital asset).
365. The drawback of a protective election is that it could be argued that the election indi-
cates that the service provider believes he or she is a partner of the proprietor. Whether a part-
nership exists for tax purposes may be questionable and such characterization may be
undesirable. The election may be considered evidence of partnership intent. See supra notes 2-48
and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
367. See, e.g., Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974); see supra text ac-
companying notes 89-95.
368. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
369. This type of analysis seems to have influenced the Eighth Circuit to decide Campbell's
interest had no value. See supra notes,310-12 and accompanying text.
370. See I.R.C. §§ 83(a)(1), (c)(l)-(2) (1992); see supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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ices, such a clause would have a substantial business purpose. Once
the two aforementioned safeguards are utilized, one is not far from a
step that would minimize or eliminate value under section 83. Under
section 83(a), the value of a profits interest can be substantially dimin-
ished by subjecting it to a nonlapse restriction. 37' An appropriate
choice would be a provision requiring that if the service provider ever
withdraws from the joint venture, his or her profits interest must be
sold back to the proprietor at a predetermined or formula price. Dur-
ing the first year, this price would be very low or perhaps nothing,
indicating a low initial value of the interest.1 2 If the approach in
Campbell is used to value the interest,3 3 the position that the profits
interest had little or no value when received will be enhanced if the
service provider and proprietor are involved in a new enterprise or one
with a poor profits history.3 74 However, the use of projected tax sav-
ings from the pass-through of projected losses, deductions, and cred-
its as a factor in using this future benefits approach should be
anticipated. a75 The riskiness of the venture and the aggressiveness of
the tax projections may, however, minimize the value of the projected
benefits.7 6 Nonetheless, the technique of anticipating immediate taxa-
tion of the service provider and structuring the service provider's in-
terest to the extent possible to have little or no value, at least
alleviates, and at best eliminates, the adverse tax consequences of dou-
ble taxation and deduction and the incompatibility of section 83 and
subchapter K. 377
V. CONCLUSION
At this point in time, it is difficult, if not impossible, to be certain
of the potential tax consequences of a recharacterization of a service
contract that provides for contingent compensation measured as a
percentage of profit. There can be little doubt that the prospect of
partnership characterization is very real where the Internal Revenue
Service determines that other indicia of a partnership relationship in
addition to profit sharing are present. The presence of some of these
371. See I.R.C. §§ 83(a)(1), (d)(l) (1992).
372. SeeWM.LISETAL., supra note 53, § 46.12.
373. See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 274-82 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
377. See Wuus ET AL., supra note 53, § 46; Martin B. Cowan, Receipt of an Interest in
Partnership Profits in Consideration for Services: The Diamond Case, 27 TAX L. REV. 161
(1972).
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other indicia can almost always be found in a service contract provid-
ing for contingent compensation.
Once it is determined that a constructive partnership exists, the con-
clusion that the service provider has received a partnership profits in-
terest in exchange for services naturally follows. The service
provider's constructive interest by its nature can only be in the part-
nership's profits, and not in its assets.
It is at this point in the analysis that one finds oneself almost at a
total loss. There can be no doubt that it is possible that the value of
the profits interest will be found to be includable in income upon re-
ceipt. It is difficult to be certain of more than that. Will it matter
whether the interest was received in exchange for future rather than
past services? Will it matter whether the services are performed in a
partner rather than a nonpartner capacity? If the interest's value is
included in income, what valuation method will be used? Will it mat-
ter whether the venture is new and uncertain? Will it matter whether
projections indicate that the partnership will soon generate profits
rather than losses? Will it matter how aggressive the constructive part-
nership is in claiming tax benefits that give rise to tax losses? Once
some amount is included in income, how will problems of double in-
come to the service provider and double deduction to the proprietor
be rectified? All of these issues and more continue to exist even after
the Campbell decision and Revenue Procedure 93-27.
All of these unresolved questions amply demonstrate that the ad-
ministrative complexity engendered by the inclusion in income of the
value of a profits interest is simply not worth the benefit of including
the present value of the profits in income now, rather than the actual
profits in income later. While the solution does not appear to be in the
nonrecognition provisions of the Code, one need not go that far to
find an answer. Given the nature of a partnership profits interest,
there is a substantial basis for concluding that income realization does
not occur upon its receipt.
A partnership is essentially a pass-through entity. Through the vehi-
cle of partnership, individual partners combine their capital and skills
in a business venture. The ultimate profits reaped from this combina-
tion yield an income stream that is taxed only at the partners' level.
Where an individual performs services in exchange for a partnership
profits interest, there is no theoretical ground for currently taxing the
mere receipt of the interest consistent with the flow-through nature of
a partnership. The need for consistency in applying this fundamental
principle of partnership taxation mandates that the profits partner be
taxed only when profits are earned by the partnership.
PARTNERSHIP PROFIT INTERESTS
Treating the receipt of a profits interest as a nonrealization event
would be consistent with several notions underlying the development
of tax policy. First, it would follow past, long-standing, IRS adminis-
trative practice. The IRS, from the time of the Diamond decision until
Campbell, did not actively pursue the inclusion in income of profits
interests received for services. Evidence of its administrative position
of nontaxability are found in the regulations and proposed regulations
under section 721 79 and other administrative materials.
3 79
Second, the taxation of income should be grounded on essential no-
tions of equity. One such notion is that of horizontal equity; similarly
situated individuals should be taxed alike. The partner who receives a
partnership profits interest for services is in no different position with
respect to his or her interest in the potential future partnership profits
from that of any other partner. Thus, it is impossible on grounds of
horizontal equity to justify current taxation of a profits partner's po-
tential future income stream, when other partners are taxed as the in-
come is earned by the partnership. Moreover, since the Code provides
no mechanism for amortizing the profits partner's "tax basis" in his
or her interest, unlike the other partners, the profits partner will be
taxed twice on the partnership's income to the extent that it was al-
ready included in the value of the profits interest received. Such dou-
ble taxation offends basic notions of tax equity.
It could be argued that for the purposes of a tax equity analysis, a
profits partner should be compared to a capital partner who receives
his or her interest for services, the latter of whom is taxed upon re-
ceipt of the partnership interest. Such a comparison, however, is inap-
propriate. The capital partner is not in the same position, from a
taxability standpoint, as the profits partner. First, the capital partner
has an immediate interest in the partnership's assets. In the event of a
sale or liquidation, the capital partner shares in the proceeds. Moreo-
ver, the value of a capital partner's interest is not dependent solely
upon the future income of the partnership. Thus, income inclusion
does not result in conspicuous double taxation of the capital partner's
share of partnership income.
Concerns that an opportunity for abuse would be created by distin-
guishing the receipt of a profits interest from the receipt of a capital
interest for services could be resolved. The distinction between a capi-
tal and a profits interest under regulation section 1.721-1(b)(1) could
378. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960); Prop. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1), 25 Fed. Reg. 11814
(1960).
379. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 23, 1975); INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AUDIT, EXAm-
NATION TAX SIELTER HANDBOOK (CCH) 7295-87 (1992).
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be further developed to address more complex situations, such as
where a partner contributes both capital and services, or receives in-
terests in both assets and profits. Revenue Procedure 93-27's defini-
tions are a step in this direction. 80 Certainly the issues attendant to
distinguishing these types of interests would be capable of resolution
in a more equitable and administratively manageable way than resolu-
tion of the issues generated from the inclusion in current income of
the value of a profits interest.
Finally, our federal system of income taxation does not support the
current taxation of an individual's future earning capacity. Such ca-
pacity is not an appropriate measure of one's ability to pay income
tax. If it was, a tax would be levied upon current accumulations of
human capital. It is not, for many of the same reasons that receipt of
a profits interest for services should not be currently taxed. Currently
taxing the receipt of a profits interest for services is not fundamentally
different from taxing earning capacity; it represents taxation of poten-
tial earned income. Such taxation is unacceptable if equitable princi-
ples are to guide the structuring of our system of income taxation.
The time is long past for Congress or the IRS to take definitive
action in this area. The theory of nonrealization offers a sound basis
upon which to act, one that will lead to an administratively managea-
ble and equitable outcome. The recent ABA report goes a long way
toward advocating this more realistic approach. It remains to be seen,
however, whether Congress or the IRS will heed the call to deal defini-
tively with this long-standing source of income tax uncertainty.
380. See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-24 I.R.B. 63, 64; supra notes 325-27 and accompanying text.
